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Single Idea 15006

[filed under theme 7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding ]

Full Idea

When p 'grounds' q then q holds in virtue of p's holding; q's holding is nothing beyond p's holding; the truth of p explains the truth of q in a particularly tight sense (explanation of q by p in this sense requires that p necessitates q).

Gist of Idea

Something is grounded when it holds, and is explained, and necessitated by something else

Source

report of Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], 15-16) by Theodore Sider - Writing the Book of the World 08.1

Book Ref

Sider,Theodore: 'Writing the Book of the World' [OUP 2011], p.142

A Reaction

This proposal has become a hot topic in current metaphysics, as attempts are made to employ 'grounding' in various logical, epistemological and ontological contexts. I'm a fan - it is at the heart of metaphysics as structure of reality.

Related Idea

Idea 15007 If you make 'grounding' fundamental, you have to mention some non-fundamental notions [Sider on Fine,K]

The 17 ideas from 'The Question of Realism'

15007 If you make 'grounding' fundamental, you have to mention some non-fundamental notions [Sider on Fine,K]
15047 What is real can only be settled in terms of 'ground' [Fine,K]
15046 Reality is a primitive metaphysical concept, which cannot be understood in other terms [Fine,K]
15048 In metaphysics, reality is regarded as either 'factual', or as 'fundamental' [Fine,K]
15006 Something is grounded when it holds, and is explained, and necessitated by something else [Fine,K, by Sider]
15050 Reduction might be producing a sentence which gets closer to the logical form [Fine,K]
15051 Reduction might be semantic, where a reduced sentence is understood through its reduction [Fine,K]
15052 Reduction is modal, if the reductions necessarily entail the truth of the target sentence [Fine,K]
15054 'Quietist' says abandon metaphysics because answers are unattainable (as in Kant's noumenon) [Fine,K]
15053 If metaphysics can't be settled, it hardly matters whether it makes sense [Fine,K]
15055 Grounding relations are best expressed as relations between sentences [Fine,K]
15056 The notion of reduction (unlike that of 'ground') implies the unreality of what is reduced [Fine,K]
15057 Ultimate explanations are in 'grounds', which account for other truths, which hold in virtue of the grounding [Fine,K]
15058 A proposition ingredient is 'essential' if changing it would change the truth-value [Fine,K]
15059 Grounding is an explanation of truth, and needs all the virtues of good explanations [Fine,K]
15061 Although colour depends on us, we can describe the world that way if it picks out fundamentals [Fine,K]
15060 Why should what is explanatorily basic be therefore more real? [Fine,K]