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Single Idea 15007
[filed under theme 7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
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Full Idea
My main objection to Fine's notion of grounding as fundamental is that it violates 'purity' - that fundamental truths should involve only fundamental notions.
Gist of Idea
If you make 'grounding' fundamental, you have to mention some non-fundamental notions
Source
comment on Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001]) by Theodore Sider - Writing the Book of the World 08.2
Book Ref
Sider,Theodore: 'Writing the Book of the World' [OUP 2011], p.144
A Reaction
[p.106 of Sider for 'purity'] The point here is that to define a grounding relation you have to mention the 'higher' levels of the relationship (as in a 'city' being grounded in physical stuff), which doesn't seem fundamental enough.
Related Idea
Idea 15006
Something is grounded when it holds, and is explained, and necessitated by something else [Fine,K, by Sider]
The
17 ideas
from 'The Question of Realism'
15007
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If you make 'grounding' fundamental, you have to mention some non-fundamental notions
[Sider on Fine,K]
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15047
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What is real can only be settled in terms of 'ground'
[Fine,K]
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15046
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Reality is a primitive metaphysical concept, which cannot be understood in other terms
[Fine,K]
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15048
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In metaphysics, reality is regarded as either 'factual', or as 'fundamental'
[Fine,K]
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15006
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Something is grounded when it holds, and is explained, and necessitated by something else
[Fine,K, by Sider]
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15050
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Reduction might be producing a sentence which gets closer to the logical form
[Fine,K]
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15051
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Reduction might be semantic, where a reduced sentence is understood through its reduction
[Fine,K]
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15052
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Reduction is modal, if the reductions necessarily entail the truth of the target sentence
[Fine,K]
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15054
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'Quietist' says abandon metaphysics because answers are unattainable (as in Kant's noumenon)
[Fine,K]
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15053
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If metaphysics can't be settled, it hardly matters whether it makes sense
[Fine,K]
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15055
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Grounding relations are best expressed as relations between sentences
[Fine,K]
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15056
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The notion of reduction (unlike that of 'ground') implies the unreality of what is reduced
[Fine,K]
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15057
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Ultimate explanations are in 'grounds', which account for other truths, which hold in virtue of the grounding
[Fine,K]
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15058
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A proposition ingredient is 'essential' if changing it would change the truth-value
[Fine,K]
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15059
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Grounding is an explanation of truth, and needs all the virtues of good explanations
[Fine,K]
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15060
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Why should what is explanatorily basic be therefore more real?
[Fine,K]
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15061
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Although colour depends on us, we can describe the world that way if it picks out fundamentals
[Fine,K]
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