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Full Idea
The truthmaker theorist's 'concrete' states of affairs must be distinguished from necessarily existing 'abstract' states of affairs.
Gist of Idea
We must distinguish 'concrete' from 'abstract' and necessary states of affairs.
Source
Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 08.4)
Book Ref
Sider,Theodore: 'Writing the Book of the World' [OUP 2011], p.154
A Reaction
[He cites Plantinga's 'Nature of Necessity' for the second one; I presume the first one is Armstrong]
| 5465 | Modern trope theory tries, like logical atomism, to reduce things to elementary states [Russell, by Ellis] |
| 15809 | A state of affairs pertains to a thing if it implies that it has some property [Chisholm] |
| 15828 | I propose that events and propositions are two types of states of affairs [Chisholm] |
| 15829 | The mark of a state of affairs is that it is capable of being accepted [Chisholm] |
| 18374 | Truthmaking needs states of affairs, to unite particulars with tropes or universals. [Armstrong] |
| 15267 | Events are changes in states of affairs (which consist of structured particulars, with powers and relations) [Harré/Madden] |
| 15543 | How do things combine to make states of affairs? Constituents can repeat, and fail to combine [Lewis] |
| 15009 | We must distinguish 'concrete' from 'abstract' and necessary states of affairs. [Sider] |