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Single Idea 15024
[filed under theme 27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / f. Eternalism
]
Full Idea
The spotlight theorist accepts the block universe, but also something in addition: a joint-carving monadic property of presentness, which is possessed by just one moment of time, and which 'moves', to be possessed by later and later times.
Clarification
The block universe is eternalism
Gist of Idea
The spotlight theorists accepts eternal time, but with a spotlight of the present moving across it
Source
Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 11.9)
Book Ref
Sider,Theodore: 'Writing the Book of the World' [OUP 2011], p.259
A Reaction
This seems better than the merely detached eternalist view, which seems to ignore the key phenomenon. I just can't comprehend any theory which makes the future as real as the past.
The
124 ideas
from Theodore Sider
14752
|
Artists 'create' statues because they are essentially statues, and so lack identity with the lump of clay
[Sider]
|
14721
|
Metaphysical enquiry can survive if its conclusions are tentative
[Sider]
|
14722
|
Between presentism and eternalism is the 'growing block' view - the past is real, the future is not
[Sider]
|
14723
|
Talk using tenses can be eliminated, by reducing it to indexical connections for an utterance
[Sider]
|
14724
|
Presentists must deny truths about multiple times
[Sider]
|
14725
|
Maybe motion is a dynamical quantity intrinsic to a thing at a particular time
[Sider]
|
14194
|
Proper ontology should only use categorical (actual) properties, not hypothetical ones
[Sider]
|
14726
|
Four-dimensionalists assert 'temporal parts', 'perduring', and being spread out over time
[Sider]
|
14727
|
Three-dimensionalists assert 'enduring', being wholly present at each moment, and deny 'temporal parts'
[Sider]
|
14728
|
4D says intrinsic change is difference between successive parts
[Sider]
|
14729
|
4D says each spatiotemporal object must have a temporal part at every moment at which it exists
[Sider]
|
14730
|
Temporal parts exist, but are not prior building blocks for objects
[Sider]
|
14731
|
Temporal parts are instantaneous
[Sider]
|
14734
|
The B-series involves eternalism, and the reduction of tense
[Sider]
|
14735
|
Space is 3D and lacks a direction; time seems connected to causation
[Sider]
|
14736
|
The B-theory is adequate, except that it omits to say which time is present
[Sider]
|
14741
|
The ship undergoes 'asymmetric' fission, where one candidate is seen as stronger
[Sider]
|
14740
|
If Tib is all of Tibbles bar her tail, when Tibbles loses her tail, two different things become one
[Sider]
|
14743
|
The stage view of objects is best for dealing with coincident entities
[Sider]
|
14745
|
If sortal terms fix the kind and the persistence conditions, we need to know what kinds there are
[Sider]
|
14747
|
'Composition as identity' says that an object just is the objects which compose it
[Sider]
|
14754
|
If you say Leibniz's Law doesn't apply to 'timebound' properties, you are no longer discussing identity
[Sider]
|
14756
|
For Presentists there must always be a temporal vantage point for any description
[Sider]
|
14757
|
Mereological essentialism says an object's parts are necessary for its existence
[Sider]
|
14758
|
How can an instantaneous stage believe anything, if beliefs take time?
[Sider]
|
14760
|
Four-dimensionalism sees things and processes as belonging in the same category
[Sider]
|
14762
|
Four-dimensionalism says temporal parts are caused (through laws of motion) by previous temporal parts
[Sider]
|
14763
|
Counterparts rest on similarity, so there are many such relations in different contexts
[Sider]
|
14738
|
Some might say that its inconsistency with time travel is a reason to favour three-dimensionalism
[Sider]
|
13678
|
The most popular account of logical consequence is the semantic or model-theoretic one
[Sider]
|
13682
|
Maybe logical consequence is impossibility of the premises being true and the consequent false
[Sider]
|
13680
|
Maybe logical consequence is a primitive notion
[Sider]
|
13679
|
Maybe logical consequence is more a matter of provability than of truth-preservation
[Sider]
|
13683
|
A relation is a feature of multiple objects taken together
[Sider]
|
13724
|
In model theory, first define truth, then validity as truth in all models, and consequence as truth-preservation
[Sider]
|
13684
|
The semantical notion of a logical truth is validity, being true in all interpretations
[Sider]
|
13685
|
Natural deduction helpfully allows reasoning with assumptions
[Sider]
|
13686
|
We can build proofs just from conclusions, rather than from plain formulae
[Sider]
|
13688
|
Good axioms should be indisputable logical truths
[Sider]
|
13687
|
No assumptions in axiomatic proofs, so no conditional proof or reductio
[Sider]
|
13689
|
'Theorems' are formulas provable from no premises at all
[Sider]
|
13691
|
Induction has a 'base case', then an 'inductive hypothesis', and then the 'inductive step'
[Sider]
|
13690
|
Proof by induction 'on the length of the formula' deconstructs a formula into its accepted atoms
[Sider]
|
13692
|
A 'precisification' of a trivalent interpretation reduces it to a bivalent interpretation
[Sider]
|
13693
|
A 'supervaluation' assigns further Ts and Fs, if they have been assigned in every precisification
[Sider]
|
13695
|
Supervaluational logic is classical, except when it adds the 'Definitely' operator
[Sider]
|
13694
|
We can 'sharpen' vague terms, and then define truth as true-on-all-sharpenings
[Sider]
|
13697
|
Valuations in PC assign truth values to formulas relative to variable assignments
[Sider]
|
13696
|
When a variable is 'free' of the quantifier, the result seems incapable of truth or falsity
[Sider]
|
13698
|
In a complete logic you can avoid axiomatic proofs, by using models to show consequences
[Sider]
|
13699
|
Compactness surprisingly says that no contradictions can emerge when the set goes infinite
[Sider]
|
13700
|
A 'total' function must always produce an output for a given domain
[Sider]
|
13701
|
A single second-order sentence validates all of arithmetic - but this can't be proved axiomatically
[Sider]
|
13702
|
The identity of indiscernibles is necessarily true, if being a member of some set counts as a property
[Sider]
|
13703
|
λ can treat 'is cold and hungry' as a single predicate
[Sider]
|
13704
|
It is hard to say which are the logical truths in modal logic, especially for iterated modal operators
[Sider]
|
13705
|
Truth tables assume truth functionality, and are just pictures of truth functions
[Sider]
|
13706
|
Intuitively, deontic accessibility seems not to be reflexive, but to be serial
[Sider]
|
13707
|
Maybe metaphysical accessibility is intransitive, if a world in which I am a frog is impossible
[Sider]
|
13708
|
S5 is the strongest system, since it has the most valid formulas, because it is easy to be S5-valid
[Sider]
|
13709
|
Logical truths must be necessary if anything is
[Sider]
|
13710
|
In D we add that 'what is necessary is possible'; then tautologies are possible, and contradictions not necessary
[Sider]
|
13711
|
System B introduces iterated modalities
[Sider]
|
13712
|
Epistemic accessibility is reflexive, and allows positive and negative introspection (KK and K¬K)
[Sider]
|
13714
|
We can treat modal worlds as different times
[Sider]
|
13715
|
You can employ intuitionist logic without intuitionism about mathematics
[Sider]
|
13716
|
'If B hadn't shot L someone else would have' if false; 'If B didn't shoot L, someone else did' is true
[Sider]
|
13717
|
Transworld identity is not a problem in de dicto sentences, which needn't identify an individual
[Sider]
|
13719
|
Barcan Formula problem: there might have been a ghost, despite nothing existing which could be a ghost
[Sider]
|
13720
|
Converse Barcan Formula: □∀αφ→∀α□φ
[Sider]
|
13718
|
The Barcan Formula ∀x□Fx→□∀xFx may be a defect in modal logic
[Sider]
|
13721
|
'Strong' necessity in all possible worlds; 'weak' necessity in the worlds where the relevant objects exist
[Sider]
|
13723
|
System B is needed to prove the Barcan Formula
[Sider]
|
13722
|
A 'theorem' is an axiom, or the last line of a legitimate proof
[Sider]
|
9218
|
Maybe what distinguishes philosophy from science is its pursuit of necessary truths
[Sider]
|
14977
|
Metaphysics is not about what exists or is true or essential; it is about the structure of reality
[Sider]
|
14978
|
A property is intrinsic if an object alone in the world can instantiate it
[Sider]
|
14980
|
There is a real issue over what is the 'correct' logic
[Sider]
|
14981
|
Philosophical concepts are rarely defined, and are not understood by means of definitions
[Sider]
|
14982
|
If I used Ramsey sentences to eliminate fundamentality from my theory, that would be a real loss
[Sider]
|
14984
|
Which should be primitive in mereology - part, or overlap?
[Sider]
|
14983
|
Accept the ontology of your best theory - and also that it carves nature at the joints
[Sider]
|
14985
|
The notion of law doesn't seem to enhance physical theories
[Sider]
|
14986
|
Conceptual analysts trust particular intuitions much more than general ones
[Sider]
|
14987
|
Many of the key theories of modern physics do not appear to be 'laws'
[Sider]
|
14988
|
A theory which doesn't fit nature is unexplanatory, even if it is true
[Sider]
|
14989
|
Problem predicates in induction don't reflect the structure of nature
[Sider]
|
14990
|
Bayes produces weird results if the prior probabilities are bizarre
[Sider]
|
14991
|
Space has real betweenness and congruence structure (though it is not the Euclidean concepts)
[Sider]
|
14992
|
We don't care about plain truth, but truth in joint-carving terms
[Sider]
|
14994
|
Extreme doubts about metaphysics also threaten to undermine the science of unobservables
[Sider]
|
14995
|
Predicates can be 'sparse' if there is a universal, or if there is a natural property or relation
[Sider]
|
14997
|
Two applications of 'grue' do not guarantee a similarity between two things
[Sider]
|
15000
|
'It is raining' and 'it is not raining' can't be legislated, so we can't legislate 'p or ¬p'
[Sider]
|
15001
|
'Tonk' is supposed to follow the elimination and introduction rules, but it can't be so interpreted
[Sider]
|
14999
|
Prior to conventions, not all green things were green?
[Sider]
|
14998
|
Conventions are contingent and analytic truths are necessary, so that isn't their explanation
[Sider]
|
15004
|
'Gunk' is an object in which proper parts all endlessly have further proper parts
[Sider]
|
15005
|
Explanations must cite generalisations
[Sider]
|
15003
|
It seems unlikely that the way we speak will give insights into the universe
[Sider]
|
15008
|
Is fundamentality in whole propositions (and holistic), or in concepts (and atomic)?
[Sider]
|
15009
|
We must distinguish 'concrete' from 'abstract' and necessary states of affairs.
[Sider]
|
15010
|
Your metaphysics is 'cheating' if your ontology won't support the beliefs you accept
[Sider]
|
15012
|
Orthodox truthmaker theories make entities fundamental, but that is poor for explanation
[Sider]
|
15011
|
If the ultimate explanation is a list of entities, no laws, patterns or mechanisms can be cited
[Sider]
|
15013
|
Tables and chairs have fundamental existence, but not fundamental natures
[Sider]
|
15017
|
Supervenience is a modal connection
[Sider]
|
15014
|
Unlike things, stuff obeys unrestricted composition and mereological essentialism
[Sider]
|
15015
|
It seems possible for a correct definition to be factually incorrect, as in defining 'contact'
[Sider]
|
15016
|
Analyticity has lost its traditional role, which relied on truth by convention
[Sider]
|
15019
|
Define logical constants by role in proofs, or as fixed in meaning, or as topic-neutral
[Sider]
|
15020
|
Classical logic is good for mathematics and science, but less good for natural language
[Sider]
|
15021
|
The central question in the philosophy of time is: How alike are time and space?
[Sider]
|
15024
|
The spotlight theorists accepts eternal time, but with a spotlight of the present moving across it
[Sider]
|
15023
|
The Barcan schema implies if X might have fathered something, there is something X might have fathered
[Sider]
|
15025
|
The world does not contain necessity and possibility - merely how things are
[Sider]
|
15027
|
If truths are necessary 'by convention', that seems to make them contingent
[Sider]
|
15028
|
Conventionalism doesn't seem to apply to examples of the necessary a posteriori
[Sider]
|
15026
|
Essence (even if nonmodal) is not fundamental in metaphysics
[Sider]
|
15033
|
Humeans says mathematics and logic are necessary because that is how our concept of necessity works
[Sider]
|
15030
|
Humeans say that we decide what is necessary
[Sider]
|
15029
|
Modal accounts of logical consequence are simple necessity, or essential use of logical words
[Sider]
|
15031
|
Modal terms in English are entirely contextual, with no modality outside the language
[Sider]
|
15018
|
Intentionality is too superficial to appear in the catalogue of ultimate physics
[Sider]
|