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Full Idea
If □φ says that φ is true by convention, then □φ would apparently turn out to be contingent, since statements about what conventions we adopt are not themselves true by convention. The main axioms of S4 and S5 would be false.
Gist of Idea
If truths are necessary 'by convention', that seems to make them contingent
Source
Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 12.1)
Book Ref
Sider,Theodore: 'Writing the Book of the World' [OUP 2011], p.268
Related Idea
Idea 15000 'It is raining' and 'it is not raining' can't be legislated, so we can't legislate 'p or ¬p' [Sider]
| 18726 | For each necessity in the world there is an arbitrary rule of language [Wittgenstein] |
| 15233 | If natural necessity is used to include or exclude some predicate, the predicate is conceptually necessary [Harré/Madden] |
| 15242 | Having a child is contingent for a 'man', necessary for a 'father'; the latter reflects a necessity of nature [Harré/Madden] |
| 13973 | A key achievement of Kripke is showing that important modalities are not linguistic in source [Soames] |
| 12433 | If necessity rests on linguistic conventions, those are contingent, so there is no necessity [Hale] |
| 15027 | If truths are necessary 'by convention', that seems to make them contingent [Sider] |
| 15028 | Conventionalism doesn't seem to apply to examples of the necessary a posteriori [Sider] |
| 15032 | Necessary a posteriori is conventional for necessity and nonmodal for a posteriority [Sidelle, by Sider] |
| 15179 | To know empirical necessities, we need empirical facts, plus conventions about which are necessary [Sidelle] |
| 6582 | Conventions can only work if they are based on something non-conventional [Fogelin] |
| 14478 | Modal Conventionalism says modality is analytic, not intrinsic to the world, and linguistic [Thomasson] |