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Full Idea
Conventionalism is apparently inapplicable to Kripke's and Putnam's examples of the necessary a posteriori (and, relatedly, to de re modality).
Gist of Idea
Conventionalism doesn't seem to apply to examples of the necessary a posteriori
Source
Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 12.1)
Book Ref
Sider,Theodore: 'Writing the Book of the World' [OUP 2011], p.268
A Reaction
[Sidelle 1989 discusses this]
18726 | For each necessity in the world there is an arbitrary rule of language [Wittgenstein] |
15233 | If natural necessity is used to include or exclude some predicate, the predicate is conceptually necessary [Harré/Madden] |
15242 | Having a child is contingent for a 'man', necessary for a 'father'; the latter reflects a necessity of nature [Harré/Madden] |
13973 | A key achievement of Kripke is showing that important modalities are not linguistic in source [Soames] |
12433 | If necessity rests on linguistic conventions, those are contingent, so there is no necessity [Hale] |
15027 | If truths are necessary 'by convention', that seems to make them contingent [Sider] |
15028 | Conventionalism doesn't seem to apply to examples of the necessary a posteriori [Sider] |
15032 | Necessary a posteriori is conventional for necessity and nonmodal for a posteriority [Sidelle, by Sider] |
15179 | To know empirical necessities, we need empirical facts, plus conventions about which are necessary [Sidelle] |
6582 | Conventions can only work if they are based on something non-conventional [Fogelin] |
14478 | Modal Conventionalism says modality is analytic, not intrinsic to the world, and linguistic [Thomasson] |