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Single Idea 15050

[filed under theme 7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction ]

Full Idea

One line of reduction is logical analysis. To say one sentence reduces to another is to say that they express the same proposition (or fact), but the grammatical form of the second is closer to the logical form than the grammatical form of the first.

Gist of Idea

Reduction might be producing a sentence which gets closer to the logical form

Source

Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], 3)

Book Ref

-: 'Philosophers' Imprint' [-], p.8


A Reaction

Fine objects that S-and-T reduces to S and T, which is two propositions. He also objects that this approach misses the de re ingredient in reduction (that it is about the things themselves, not the sentences). It also overemphasises logical form.

Related Idea

Idea 15051 Reduction might be semantic, where a reduced sentence is understood through its reduction [Fine,K]


The 17 ideas from 'The Question of Realism'

If you make 'grounding' fundamental, you have to mention some non-fundamental notions [Sider on Fine,K]
What is real can only be settled in terms of 'ground' [Fine,K]
Reality is a primitive metaphysical concept, which cannot be understood in other terms [Fine,K]
In metaphysics, reality is regarded as either 'factual', or as 'fundamental' [Fine,K]
Something is grounded when it holds, and is explained, and necessitated by something else [Fine,K, by Sider]
Reduction might be producing a sentence which gets closer to the logical form [Fine,K]
Reduction might be semantic, where a reduced sentence is understood through its reduction [Fine,K]
Reduction is modal, if the reductions necessarily entail the truth of the target sentence [Fine,K]
'Quietist' says abandon metaphysics because answers are unattainable (as in Kant's noumenon) [Fine,K]
If metaphysics can't be settled, it hardly matters whether it makes sense [Fine,K]
Grounding relations are best expressed as relations between sentences [Fine,K]
The notion of reduction (unlike that of 'ground') implies the unreality of what is reduced [Fine,K]
Ultimate explanations are in 'grounds', which account for other truths, which hold in virtue of the grounding [Fine,K]
A proposition ingredient is 'essential' if changing it would change the truth-value [Fine,K]
Grounding is an explanation of truth, and needs all the virtues of good explanations [Fine,K]
Although colour depends on us, we can describe the world that way if it picks out fundamentals [Fine,K]
Why should what is explanatorily basic be therefore more real? [Fine,K]