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Single Idea 15051

[filed under theme 7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction ]

Full Idea

A second line of reduction is semantic, and holds in virtue of the meaning of the sentences. It should then be possible to acquire an understanding of the reduced sentence on the basis of understanding the sentences to which it reduces.

Gist of Idea

Reduction might be semantic, where a reduced sentence is understood through its reduction

Source

Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], 3)

Book Ref

-: 'Philosophers' Imprint' [-], p.9


A Reaction

Fine says this avoids the first objection to the grammatical approach (see Reaction to Idea 15050), but still can't handle the de re aspect of reduction. Fine also doubts whether this understanding qualifies as 'reduction'.

Related Idea

Idea 15050 Reduction might be producing a sentence which gets closer to the logical form [Fine,K]


The 17 ideas from 'The Question of Realism'

If you make 'grounding' fundamental, you have to mention some non-fundamental notions [Sider on Fine,K]
What is real can only be settled in terms of 'ground' [Fine,K]
Reality is a primitive metaphysical concept, which cannot be understood in other terms [Fine,K]
In metaphysics, reality is regarded as either 'factual', or as 'fundamental' [Fine,K]
Something is grounded when it holds, and is explained, and necessitated by something else [Fine,K, by Sider]
Reduction might be producing a sentence which gets closer to the logical form [Fine,K]
Reduction might be semantic, where a reduced sentence is understood through its reduction [Fine,K]
Reduction is modal, if the reductions necessarily entail the truth of the target sentence [Fine,K]
'Quietist' says abandon metaphysics because answers are unattainable (as in Kant's noumenon) [Fine,K]
If metaphysics can't be settled, it hardly matters whether it makes sense [Fine,K]
Grounding relations are best expressed as relations between sentences [Fine,K]
The notion of reduction (unlike that of 'ground') implies the unreality of what is reduced [Fine,K]
Ultimate explanations are in 'grounds', which account for other truths, which hold in virtue of the grounding [Fine,K]
A proposition ingredient is 'essential' if changing it would change the truth-value [Fine,K]
Grounding is an explanation of truth, and needs all the virtues of good explanations [Fine,K]
Although colour depends on us, we can describe the world that way if it picks out fundamentals [Fine,K]
Why should what is explanatorily basic be therefore more real? [Fine,K]