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Single Idea 15052

[filed under theme 7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction ]

Full Idea

The third, more recent, approach to reduction is a modal matter. A class of propositions will reduce to - or supervene upon - another if, necessarily, any truth from the one is entailed by truths from the other.

Gist of Idea

Reduction is modal, if the reductions necessarily entail the truth of the target sentence

Source

Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], 3)

Book Ref

-: 'Philosophers' Imprint' [-], p.10

A Reaction

[He cites Armstrong, Chalmers and Jackson for this approach] Fine notes that some people reject supervenience as a sort of reduction. He objects that this reduction doesn't necessarily lead to something more basic.

The 17 ideas from 'The Question of Realism'

15007 If you make 'grounding' fundamental, you have to mention some non-fundamental notions [Sider on Fine,K]
15047 What is real can only be settled in terms of 'ground' [Fine,K]
15046 Reality is a primitive metaphysical concept, which cannot be understood in other terms [Fine,K]
15048 In metaphysics, reality is regarded as either 'factual', or as 'fundamental' [Fine,K]
15006 Something is grounded when it holds, and is explained, and necessitated by something else [Fine,K, by Sider]
15050 Reduction might be producing a sentence which gets closer to the logical form [Fine,K]
15051 Reduction might be semantic, where a reduced sentence is understood through its reduction [Fine,K]
15052 Reduction is modal, if the reductions necessarily entail the truth of the target sentence [Fine,K]
15054 'Quietist' says abandon metaphysics because answers are unattainable (as in Kant's noumenon) [Fine,K]
15053 If metaphysics can't be settled, it hardly matters whether it makes sense [Fine,K]
15055 Grounding relations are best expressed as relations between sentences [Fine,K]
15056 The notion of reduction (unlike that of 'ground') implies the unreality of what is reduced [Fine,K]
15057 Ultimate explanations are in 'grounds', which account for other truths, which hold in virtue of the grounding [Fine,K]
15058 A proposition ingredient is 'essential' if changing it would change the truth-value [Fine,K]
15059 Grounding is an explanation of truth, and needs all the virtues of good explanations [Fine,K]
15061 Although colour depends on us, we can describe the world that way if it picks out fundamentals [Fine,K]
15060 Why should what is explanatorily basic be therefore more real? [Fine,K]