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Single Idea 15055

[filed under theme 7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding ]

Full Idea

I recommend that a statement of ground be cast in the following 'canonical' form: Its being the case that S consists in nothing more than its being the case that T, U... (where S, T, U... are particular sentences).

Gist of Idea

Grounding relations are best expressed as relations between sentences

Source

Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], 5)

Book Ref

-: 'Philosophers' Imprint' [-], p.15


A Reaction

The point here is that grounding is to be undestood in terms of sentences (and 'its being the case that...'), rather than in terms of objects, properties or relations. Fine thus makes grounding a human activity, rather than a natural activity.


The 17 ideas from 'The Question of Realism'

If you make 'grounding' fundamental, you have to mention some non-fundamental notions [Sider on Fine,K]
What is real can only be settled in terms of 'ground' [Fine,K]
Reality is a primitive metaphysical concept, which cannot be understood in other terms [Fine,K]
In metaphysics, reality is regarded as either 'factual', or as 'fundamental' [Fine,K]
Something is grounded when it holds, and is explained, and necessitated by something else [Fine,K, by Sider]
Reduction might be producing a sentence which gets closer to the logical form [Fine,K]
Reduction might be semantic, where a reduced sentence is understood through its reduction [Fine,K]
Reduction is modal, if the reductions necessarily entail the truth of the target sentence [Fine,K]
'Quietist' says abandon metaphysics because answers are unattainable (as in Kant's noumenon) [Fine,K]
If metaphysics can't be settled, it hardly matters whether it makes sense [Fine,K]
Grounding relations are best expressed as relations between sentences [Fine,K]
The notion of reduction (unlike that of 'ground') implies the unreality of what is reduced [Fine,K]
Ultimate explanations are in 'grounds', which account for other truths, which hold in virtue of the grounding [Fine,K]
A proposition ingredient is 'essential' if changing it would change the truth-value [Fine,K]
Grounding is an explanation of truth, and needs all the virtues of good explanations [Fine,K]
Although colour depends on us, we can describe the world that way if it picks out fundamentals [Fine,K]
Why should what is explanatorily basic be therefore more real? [Fine,K]