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Single Idea 15057

[filed under theme 14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation ]

Full Idea

We take ground to be an explanatory relation: if the truth that P is grounded in other truths, then they account for its truth; P's being the case holds in virtue of the other truths' being the case. ...It is the ultimate form of explanation.

Gist of Idea

Ultimate explanations are in 'grounds', which account for other truths, which hold in virtue of the grounding

Source

Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], 5)

Book Ref

-: 'Philosophers' Imprint' [-], p.16


A Reaction

To be 'ultimate' that which grounds would have to be something which thwarted all further explanation. Popper, for example, got quite angry at the suggestion that we should put a block on further investigation in this way.

Related Idea

Idea 5451 Popper felt that ancient essentialism was a bar to progress [Popper, by Mautner]


The 17 ideas from 'The Question of Realism'

If you make 'grounding' fundamental, you have to mention some non-fundamental notions [Sider on Fine,K]
What is real can only be settled in terms of 'ground' [Fine,K]
Reality is a primitive metaphysical concept, which cannot be understood in other terms [Fine,K]
In metaphysics, reality is regarded as either 'factual', or as 'fundamental' [Fine,K]
Something is grounded when it holds, and is explained, and necessitated by something else [Fine,K, by Sider]
Reduction might be producing a sentence which gets closer to the logical form [Fine,K]
Reduction might be semantic, where a reduced sentence is understood through its reduction [Fine,K]
Reduction is modal, if the reductions necessarily entail the truth of the target sentence [Fine,K]
'Quietist' says abandon metaphysics because answers are unattainable (as in Kant's noumenon) [Fine,K]
If metaphysics can't be settled, it hardly matters whether it makes sense [Fine,K]
Grounding relations are best expressed as relations between sentences [Fine,K]
The notion of reduction (unlike that of 'ground') implies the unreality of what is reduced [Fine,K]
Ultimate explanations are in 'grounds', which account for other truths, which hold in virtue of the grounding [Fine,K]
A proposition ingredient is 'essential' if changing it would change the truth-value [Fine,K]
Grounding is an explanation of truth, and needs all the virtues of good explanations [Fine,K]
Although colour depends on us, we can describe the world that way if it picks out fundamentals [Fine,K]
Why should what is explanatorily basic be therefore more real? [Fine,K]