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Single Idea 15063

[filed under theme 3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths ]

Full Idea

There is a distinction between worldly and unworldly sentences, between sentences that depend for their truth upon the worldly circumstances and those that do not.

Gist of Idea

Some sentences depend for their truth on worldly circumstances, and others do not

Source

Kit Fine (Necessity and Non-Existence [2005], Intro)

Book Ref

Fine,Kit: 'Modality and Tense' [OUP 2005], p.321

A Reaction

Fine is fishing around in the area between the necessary, the a priori, truthmakers, and truth-conditions. He appears to be attempting a singlehanded reconstruction of the concepts of metaphysics. Is he major, or very marginal?

The 16 ideas from 'Necessity and Non-Existence'

15063 Some sentences depend for their truth on worldly circumstances, and others do not [Fine,K]
15065 What it is is fixed prior to existence or the object's worldly features [Fine,K]
15064 Proper necessary truths hold whatever the circumstances; transcendent truths regardless of circumstances [Fine,K]
15067 A-theorists tend to reject the tensed/tenseless distinction [Fine,K]
15066 B-theorists say tensed sentences have an unfilled argument-place for a time [Fine,K]
15069 Possible worlds may be more limited, to how things might actually turn out [Fine,K]
15068 The actual world is a totality of facts, so we also think of possible worlds as totalities [Fine,K]
15070 It is the nature of Socrates to be a man, so necessarily he is a man [Fine,K]
15071 Tensed and tenseless sentences state two sorts of fact, which belong to two different 'realms' of reality [Fine,K]
15073 Self-identity should have two components, its existence, and its neutral identity with itself [Fine,K]
15074 We would understand identity between objects, even if their existence was impossible [Fine,K]
15072 Bottom level facts are subject to time and world, middle to world but not time, and top to neither [Fine,K]
15076 Essential features of an object have no relation to how things actually are [Fine,K]
15075 Modal features are not part of entities, because they are accounted for by the entity [Fine,K]
15078 There are levels of existence, as well as reality; objects exist at the lowest level in which they can function [Fine,K]
15077 It is said that in the A-theory, all existents and objects must be tensed, as well as the sentences [Fine,K]