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Single Idea 15070

[filed under theme 10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence ]

Full Idea

It is of the nature of Socrates to be a man; and from this it appears to follow that necessarily he is a man.

Gist of Idea

It is the nature of Socrates to be a man, so necessarily he is a man

Source

Kit Fine (Necessity and Non-Existence [2005], 04)

Book Ref

Fine,Kit: 'Modality and Tense' [OUP 2005], p.328

A Reaction

I'm always puzzled by this line of thought, because it is only the intrinsic nature of beings like Socrates which decides in the first place what a 'man' is. How can something help to create a category, and then necessarily belong to that category?

The 17 ideas with the same theme [necessity comes from the essence of actual things]:

22505 The two right angles of a triangle necessitate that a quadrilateral has four [Aristotle]
12612 Some things have external causes of their necessity; others (the simple) generate necessities [Aristotle]
15108 Aristotle's says necessary truths are distinct and derive from essential truths [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
17182 Necessity is in reference to essence or to cause [Spinoza]
5447 Metaphysical necessities are true in virtue of the essences of things [Ellis]
13570 Individual essences necessitate that individual; natural kind essences necessitate kind membership [Ellis]
11162 Socrates is necessarily distinct from the Eiffel Tower, but that is not part of his essence [Fine,K]
11168 Metaphysical necessities are true in virtue of the nature of all objects [Fine,K]
15070 It is the nature of Socrates to be a man, so necessarily he is a man [Fine,K]
5449 Essentialism is often identified with belief in 'de re' necessary truths [Mautner]
18502 If basic physics has natures, then why not reality itself? That would then found the deepest necessities [Heil]
16543 If an essence implies p, then p is an essential truth, and hence metaphysically necessary [Lowe]
16544 Metaphysical necessity is either an essential truth, or rests on essential truths [Lowe]
19276 The big challenge for essentialist views of modality is things having necessary existence [Hale]
19293 Essentialism doesn't explain necessity reductively; it explains all necessities in terms of a few basic natures [Hale]
19294 If necessity derives from essences, how do we explain the necessary existence of essences? [Hale]
14371 We can base counterfactuals on powers, not possible worlds, and hence define necessity [Jacobs]