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Single Idea 15070

[filed under theme 10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence ]

Full Idea

It is of the nature of Socrates to be a man; and from this it appears to follow that necessarily he is a man.

Gist of Idea

It is the nature of Socrates to be a man, so necessarily he is a man

Source

Kit Fine (Necessity and Non-Existence [2005], 04)

Book Ref

Fine,Kit: 'Modality and Tense' [OUP 2005], p.328

A Reaction

I'm always puzzled by this line of thought, because it is only the intrinsic nature of beings like Socrates which decides in the first place what a 'man' is. How can something help to create a category, and then necessarily belong to that category?

The 16 ideas from 'Necessity and Non-Existence'

15063 Some sentences depend for their truth on worldly circumstances, and others do not [Fine,K]
15065 What it is is fixed prior to existence or the object's worldly features [Fine,K]
15064 Proper necessary truths hold whatever the circumstances; transcendent truths regardless of circumstances [Fine,K]
15067 A-theorists tend to reject the tensed/tenseless distinction [Fine,K]
15066 B-theorists say tensed sentences have an unfilled argument-place for a time [Fine,K]
15069 Possible worlds may be more limited, to how things might actually turn out [Fine,K]
15068 The actual world is a totality of facts, so we also think of possible worlds as totalities [Fine,K]
15070 It is the nature of Socrates to be a man, so necessarily he is a man [Fine,K]
15071 Tensed and tenseless sentences state two sorts of fact, which belong to two different 'realms' of reality [Fine,K]
15073 Self-identity should have two components, its existence, and its neutral identity with itself [Fine,K]
15074 We would understand identity between objects, even if their existence was impossible [Fine,K]
15072 Bottom level facts are subject to time and world, middle to world but not time, and top to neither [Fine,K]
15076 Essential features of an object have no relation to how things actually are [Fine,K]
15075 Modal features are not part of entities, because they are accounted for by the entity [Fine,K]
15078 There are levels of existence, as well as reality; objects exist at the lowest level in which they can function [Fine,K]
15077 It is said that in the A-theory, all existents and objects must be tensed, as well as the sentences [Fine,K]