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Single Idea 15072

[filed under theme 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality ]

Full Idea

At the bottom are tensed or temporal facts, subject to the vicissitudes of time and hence of the world. Then come the timeless though worldly facts, subject to the world but not to time. Top are transcendental facts, subject to neither world nor time.

Gist of Idea

Bottom level facts are subject to time and world, middle to world but not time, and top to neither

Source

Kit Fine (Necessity and Non-Existence [2005], 08)

Book Ref

Fine,Kit: 'Modality and Tense' [OUP 2005], p.341


A Reaction

For all of Fine's awesome grasp of logic and semantics, when he divides reality up as boldly as this I start to side a bit with the sceptics about modern metaphysics (like Ladyman and Ross). I daresay Fine acknowledges that it is 'speculative'.

Related Idea

Idea 15078 There are levels of existence, as well as reality; objects exist at the lowest level in which they can function [Fine,K]


The 16 ideas from 'Necessity and Non-Existence'

Some sentences depend for their truth on worldly circumstances, and others do not [Fine,K]
What it is is fixed prior to existence or the object's worldly features [Fine,K]
Proper necessary truths hold whatever the circumstances; transcendent truths regardless of circumstances [Fine,K]
A-theorists tend to reject the tensed/tenseless distinction [Fine,K]
B-theorists say tensed sentences have an unfilled argument-place for a time [Fine,K]
Possible worlds may be more limited, to how things might actually turn out [Fine,K]
The actual world is a totality of facts, so we also think of possible worlds as totalities [Fine,K]
It is the nature of Socrates to be a man, so necessarily he is a man [Fine,K]
Tensed and tenseless sentences state two sorts of fact, which belong to two different 'realms' of reality [Fine,K]
Self-identity should have two components, its existence, and its neutral identity with itself [Fine,K]
We would understand identity between objects, even if their existence was impossible [Fine,K]
Bottom level facts are subject to time and world, middle to world but not time, and top to neither [Fine,K]
Essential features of an object have no relation to how things actually are [Fine,K]
Modal features are not part of entities, because they are accounted for by the entity [Fine,K]
There are levels of existence, as well as reality; objects exist at the lowest level in which they can function [Fine,K]
It is said that in the A-theory, all existents and objects must be tensed, as well as the sentences [Fine,K]