more on this theme     |     more from this thinker

Single Idea 15074

[filed under theme 9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects ]

Full Idea

If there were impossible objects, ones that do not possibly exist, we would have no difficulty in understanding what it is for such objects to be identical or distinct than in the case of possible objects.

Gist of Idea

We would understand identity between objects, even if their existence was impossible

Source

Kit Fine (Necessity and Non-Existence [2005], 08)

Book Ref

Fine,Kit: 'Modality and Tense' [OUP 2005], p.344

A Reaction

Thus, a 'circular square' seems to be the same as a 'square circle'. Fine is arguing for identity to be independent of any questions of existence.

The 16 ideas from 'Necessity and Non-Existence'

15063 Some sentences depend for their truth on worldly circumstances, and others do not [Fine,K]
15065 What it is is fixed prior to existence or the object's worldly features [Fine,K]
15064 Proper necessary truths hold whatever the circumstances; transcendent truths regardless of circumstances [Fine,K]
15067 A-theorists tend to reject the tensed/tenseless distinction [Fine,K]
15066 B-theorists say tensed sentences have an unfilled argument-place for a time [Fine,K]
15069 Possible worlds may be more limited, to how things might actually turn out [Fine,K]
15068 The actual world is a totality of facts, so we also think of possible worlds as totalities [Fine,K]
15070 It is the nature of Socrates to be a man, so necessarily he is a man [Fine,K]
15071 Tensed and tenseless sentences state two sorts of fact, which belong to two different 'realms' of reality [Fine,K]
15073 Self-identity should have two components, its existence, and its neutral identity with itself [Fine,K]
15074 We would understand identity between objects, even if their existence was impossible [Fine,K]
15072 Bottom level facts are subject to time and world, middle to world but not time, and top to neither [Fine,K]
15076 Essential features of an object have no relation to how things actually are [Fine,K]
15075 Modal features are not part of entities, because they are accounted for by the entity [Fine,K]
15078 There are levels of existence, as well as reality; objects exist at the lowest level in which they can function [Fine,K]
15077 It is said that in the A-theory, all existents and objects must be tensed, as well as the sentences [Fine,K]