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Single Idea 15079

[filed under theme 10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity ]

Full Idea

I can accept 'conceptual' necessity, as long as it is only identified with 'narrow' logical necessity. For I take it that the 'conceptually' necessary is that which is true solely in virtue of concepts together with the laws of logic.

Clarification

'Conceptual' necessity rests just on concepts and logic

Gist of Idea

'Conceptual' necessity is narrow logical necessity, true because of concepts and logical laws

Source

E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 1.4)

Book Ref

Lowe,E.J.: 'The Possibility of Metaphysics' [OUP 2001], p.14


A Reaction

In the narrow version of logical necessity (Idea 8260) some definitions are required in addition to the mere laws of logic. This implies that the concepts are dependent of definitions, which is a bit restrictive. Aren't we allowed undefined concepts?

Related Idea

Idea 8260 Logical necessity can be 'strict' (laws), or 'narrow' (laws and definitions), or 'broad' (all logical worlds) [Lowe]


The 26 ideas with the same theme [different ways in which things must be]:

A stone travels upwards by a forced necessity, and downwards by natural necessity [Aristotle]
Carneades distinguished logical from causal necessity, when talking of future events [Long on Carneades]
Necessity is physical, logical, mathematical or moral [Schopenhauer, by Janaway]
The only necessity is logical necessity [Wittgenstein]
Necessities are distinguished by their grounds, not their different modalities [Ellis]
We should not multiply senses of necessity beyond necessity [Jackson]
There is 'absolute' necessity (implied by all propositions) and 'relative' necessity (from what is given) [Harré/Madden]
Strong necessity is always true; weak necessity is cannot be false [Stalnaker]
Logical possibility contains metaphysical possibility, which contains nomological possibility [Salmon,N]
The three basic types of necessity are metaphysical, natural and normative [Fine,K]
'Conceptual' necessity is narrow logical necessity, true because of concepts and logical laws [Lowe]
Logical necessities, based on laws of logic, are a proper sub-class of metaphysical necessities [Lowe]
Maybe not-p is logically possible, but p is metaphysically necessary, so the latter is not absolute [Hale]
A strong necessity entails a weaker one, but not conversely; possibilities go the other way [Hale]
'Relative' necessity is just a logical consequence of some statements ('strong' if they are all true) [Hale]
'Strong' necessity in all possible worlds; 'weak' necessity in the worlds where the relevant objects exist [Sider]
'Absolute necessity' is when there is no restriction on the things which necessitate p [Hale]
Logical and metaphysical necessities differ in their vocabulary, and their underlying entities [Hale]
Absolute necessities are necessarily necessary [Hale]
Analytic truths are divided into logically and conceptually necessary [Girle]
Is 'events have causes' analytic a priori, synthetic a posteriori, or synthetic a priori? [Baggini /Fosl]
If the laws necessarily imply p, that doesn't give a new 'nomological' necessity [Bird]
Relevant necessity is always true for some situation (not all situations) [Beall/Restall]
Physical possibility is part of metaphysical possibility which is part of logical possibility [Rami]
Superficial necessity is true in all worlds; deep necessity is thus true, no matter which world is actual [Schroeter]
A distinctive type of necessity is found in logical consequence [Rumfitt, by Hale/Hoffmann,A]