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Single Idea 15082

[filed under theme 10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity ]

Full Idea

Friends of metaphysical necessity would want to hold that when it is metaphysically necessary that p, there is no good sense of 'possible' (except, perhaps, an epistemic one) in which it is possible that not-p.

Clarification

'epistemic' possibility is possibility 'for all we know'

Gist of Idea

Metaphysical necessity says there is no possibility of falsehood

Source

Bob Hale (Absolute Necessities [1996], 2)

Book Ref

-: 'Philosophical Perspectives' [-], p.95

A Reaction

We might want to say which possible worlds this refers to (and presumably it won't just be in the actual world). The normal claim would refer to all possible worlds. Adding a '...provided that' clause moves it from absolute to relative necessity.

The 29 ideas with the same theme [inescapable necessity as a feature of reality]:

444 The first way of enquiry involves necessary existence [Parmenides]
12668 Metaphysical necessity holds between things in the world and things they make true [Ellis]
15099 If something is possible, but not nomologically possible, we need metaphysical possibility [Shoemaker]
15162 We understand metaphysical necessity intuitively, from ordinary life [Soames]
15161 There are more metaphysically than logically necessary truths [Soames]
14677 Metaphysical necessity is said to be unrestricted necessity, true in every world whatsoever [Salmon,N]
14679 Bizarre identities are logically but not metaphysically possible, so metaphysical modality is restricted [Salmon,N]
14688 Without impossible worlds, the unrestricted modality that is metaphysical has S5 logic [Salmon,N]
14690 In the S5 account, nested modalities may be unseen, but they are still there [Salmon,N]
14685 Metaphysical necessity is NOT truth in all (unrestricted) worlds; necessity comes first, and is restricted [Salmon,N]
16424 Strong metaphysical necessity allows fewer possible worlds than logical necessity [Chalmers]
16425 Metaphysical necessity is a bizarre, brute and inexplicable constraint on possibilities [Chalmers]
9209 Metaphysical necessity may be 'whatever the circumstance', or 'regardless of circumstances' [Fine,K]
12207 Metaphysical possibility is discovered empirically, and is contrained by nature [Edgington]
16063 Metaphysical necessity is logical necessity 'broadly construed' [Lowe, by Lynch/Glasgow]
16531 'Metaphysical' necessity is absolute and objective - the strongest kind of necessity [Lowe]
3105 Is 'Hesperus = Phosphorus' metaphysically necessary, but not logically or epistemologically necessary? [Segal]
15082 Metaphysical necessity says there is no possibility of falsehood [Hale]
13707 Maybe metaphysical accessibility is intransitive, if a world in which I am a frog is impossible [Sider]
18849 Metaphysical necessity is absolute and universal; metaphysical possibility is very tolerant [Rosen]
18850 'Metaphysical' modality is the one that makes the necessity or contingency of laws of nature interesting [Rosen]
18858 Sets, universals and aggregates may be metaphysically necessary in one sense, but not another [Rosen]
18857 Standard Metaphysical Necessity: P holds wherever the actual form of the world holds [Rosen]
18856 Non-Standard Metaphysical Necessity: when ¬P is incompatible with the nature of things [Rosen]
14094 The excellent notion of metaphysical 'necessity' cannot be defined [Rosen]
16277 Logically impossible is metaphysically impossible, but logically possible is not metaphysically possible [Maudlin]
11086 Metaphysical necessity can be 'weak' (same as logical) and 'strong' (based on essences) [Hanna]
18816 Metaphysical modalities respect the actual identities of things [Rumfitt]
17959 Metaphysical necessity is even more deeply empirical than Kripke has argued [Vetter]