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Single Idea 15096

[filed under theme 14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem ]

Full Idea

Perhaps 'grue' has causal features, but only derivatively, in virtue of its relation to green.

Gist of Idea

'Grue' only has causal features because of its relation to green

Source

Sydney Shoemaker (Causal and Metaphysical Necessity [1998], III)

Book Ref

Shoemaker,Sydney: 'Identity, Cause and Mind' [OUP 2003], p.413

A Reaction

I take grue to be a behaviour, and not a property at all. The problem only arises because the notion of a 'property' became too lax. Presumably Shoemaker should also mention blue in his account.

The 20 ideas with the same theme [problem of a predicate which changes over time]:

17646 Goodman showed that every sound inductive argument has an unsound one of the same form [Goodman, by Putnam]
18749 Goodman argued that the confirmation relation can never be formalised [Goodman, by Horsten/Pettigrew]
17655 Grue and green won't be in the same world, as that would block induction entirely [Goodman]
16933 Grue is a puzzle because the notions of similarity and kind are dubious in science [Quine]
17675 Unlike 'green', the 'grue' predicate involves a time and a change [Armstrong]
17683 Science suggests that the predicate 'grue' is not a genuine single universal [Armstrong]
5485 Emeralds are naturally green, and only an external force could turn them blue [Ellis]
15887 'Grue' introduces a new causal hypothesis - that emeralds can change colour [Harré]
15888 The grue problem shows that natural kinds are central to science [Harré]
15096 'Grue' only has causal features because of its relation to green [Shoemaker]
8556 Grueness is not, unlike green and blue, associated with causal potential [Shoemaker]
9652 To just expect unexamined emeralds to be grue would be totally unreasonable [Lewis]
4783 Observing lots of green x can confirm 'all x are green' or 'all x are grue', where 'grue' is arbitrary [Mautner, by PG]
3760 Predictions are bound to be arbitrary if they depend on the language used [Bernecker/Dretske]
14989 Problem predicates in induction don't reflect the structure of nature [Sider]
14997 Two applications of 'grue' do not guarantee a similarity between two things [Sider]
6738 Any conclusion can be drawn from an induction, if we use grue-like predicates [Bird]
6739 Several months of observing beech trees supports the deciduous and evergreen hypotheses [Bird]
6799 We normally learn natural kinds from laws, but Goodman shows laws require prior natural kinds [Bird]
7296 'Grue' is not a colour [Milsted]