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Full Idea
Aristotle did not subscribe to the modal conception of essence. The essential truths are not even included among the necessary truths; and the essential features of an object are similarly not included among its necessary features.
Gist of Idea
Aristotle doesn't see essential truths or essential properties as necessary
Source
report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - Essence, Necessity and Explanation 13.1
Book Ref
'Contemporary Aristotelian Metaphysics', ed/tr. Tahko,Tuomas [CUP 2012], p.187
A Reaction
I take this point to be hugely important. There is no real role for essences in metaphysics if they are not of the Aristotelian type. The necessities just lead you to trivialities, or to conventions. Aristotelian essences lead you to facts.
| 15107 | Aristotle doesn't see essential truths or essential properties as necessary [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
| 17039 | The predicates of a thing's nature are necessary to it [Aristotle] |
| 12560 | We can only slightly know necessary co-existence of qualities, if they are primary [Locke] |
| 11997 | A property may belong essentially to one thing and contingently to another [Kung] |
| 13806 | Trivially essential properties are existence, self-identity, and de dicto necessities [Forbes,G] |
| 15172 | Clearly, essential predications express necessary properties [Sidelle] |
| 15687 | Kinship is essence that comes in degrees, and age groups are essences that change over time [Gelman] |
| 15112 | If an object exists, then its essential properties are necessary [Koslicki] |
| 19262 | Essential properties are necessary, but necessary properties may not be essential [Vaidya] |