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Full Idea
We can distinguish (as Aristotle and Fine do) between what belongs to the essence of an object, and what merely follows from the essence of an object.
Gist of Idea
An essence and what merely follow from it are distinct
Source
Kathrin Koslicki (Essence, Necessity and Explanation [2012], 13.1)
Book Ref
'Contemporary Aristotelian Metaphysics', ed/tr. Tahko,Tuomas [CUP 2012], p.188
A Reaction
This can help to clarify the confusions that result from treating necessary properties as if they were essential.
| 15110 | An essence and what merely follow from it are distinct [Koslicki] |
| 15111 | In demonstration, the explanatory order must mirror the causal order of the phenomena [Koslicki] |
| 15112 | If an object exists, then its essential properties are necessary [Koslicki] |
| 15115 | In a demonstration the middle term explains, by being part of the definition [Koslicki] |
| 15113 | Individuals are perceived, but demonstration and definition require universals [Koslicki] |
| 15118 | A successful Aristotelian 'definition' is what sciences produces after an investigation [Koslicki] |
| 15116 | Essences cause necessary features, and definitions describe those necessary features [Koslicki] |
| 15114 | Discovering the Aristotelian essence of thunder will tell us why thunder occurs [Koslicki] |
| 15117 | Greek uses the same word for 'cause' and 'explanation' [Koslicki] |