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Full Idea
Individual instances of a kind of phenomenon, in Aristotle's view, can only be perceived through sense-perception; but they are not the proper subject-matter of scientific demonstration and definition.
Gist of Idea
Individuals are perceived, but demonstration and definition require universals
Source
Kathrin Koslicki (Essence, Necessity and Explanation [2012], 13.3.1)
Book Ref
'Contemporary Aristotelian Metaphysics', ed/tr. Tahko,Tuomas [CUP 2012], p.198
A Reaction
A footnote (11) explains that this is because they involve syllogisms, which require universals. I take Aristotle, and anyone sensible, to rest on individual essences, but inevitably turn to generic essences when language becomes involved.
| 15110 | An essence and what merely follow from it are distinct [Koslicki] |
| 15111 | In demonstration, the explanatory order must mirror the causal order of the phenomena [Koslicki] |
| 15112 | If an object exists, then its essential properties are necessary [Koslicki] |
| 15115 | In a demonstration the middle term explains, by being part of the definition [Koslicki] |
| 15113 | Individuals are perceived, but demonstration and definition require universals [Koslicki] |
| 15118 | A successful Aristotelian 'definition' is what sciences produces after an investigation [Koslicki] |
| 15116 | Essences cause necessary features, and definitions describe those necessary features [Koslicki] |
| 15114 | Discovering the Aristotelian essence of thunder will tell us why thunder occurs [Koslicki] |
| 15117 | Greek uses the same word for 'cause' and 'explanation' [Koslicki] |