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Single Idea 15115
[filed under theme 14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 2. Demonstration
]
Full Idea
In a proper demonstrative argument, the middle term must be explanatory of the conclusion, in a very specific sense: the middle term must state what properly belongs to the definition of the kind of phenomenon in question.
Clarification
The 'middle term' is the transitional term in a syllogism
Gist of Idea
In a demonstration the middle term explains, by being part of the definition
Source
Kathrin Koslicki (Essence, Necessity and Explanation [2012], 13.3.1)
Book Ref
'Contemporary Aristotelian Metaphysics', ed/tr. Tahko,Tuomas [CUP 2012], p.199
A Reaction
So 'All men are mortal, S is a man, so S is mortal'. The middle term is 'man', which gives a generic explanation for why S is mortal. Explanation as categorisation? I don't think this is the whole story of Aristotelian explanation.
The
48 ideas
from Kathrin Koslicki
15110
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An essence and what merely follow from it are distinct
[Koslicki]
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15111
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In demonstration, the explanatory order must mirror the causal order of the phenomena
[Koslicki]
|
15112
|
If an object exists, then its essential properties are necessary
[Koslicki]
|
15115
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In a demonstration the middle term explains, by being part of the definition
[Koslicki]
|
15118
|
A successful Aristotelian 'definition' is what sciences produces after an investigation
[Koslicki]
|
15116
|
Essences cause necessary features, and definitions describe those necessary features
[Koslicki]
|
15113
|
Individuals are perceived, but demonstration and definition require universals
[Koslicki]
|
15114
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Discovering the Aristotelian essence of thunder will tell us why thunder occurs
[Koslicki]
|
15117
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Greek uses the same word for 'cause' and 'explanation'
[Koslicki]
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24065
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Structured wholes are united by the teamwork needed for their capacities
[Koslicki]
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24066
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The form explains kind, structure, unity and activity
[Koslicki]
|
24067
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Hylomorphic compounds need an individual form for transworld identity
[Koslicki]
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24069
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Much metaphysical debate concerns what is fundamental, rather than what exists
[Koslicki]
|
17439
|
There is no deep reason why we count carrots but not asparagus
[Koslicki]
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17434
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We struggle to count branches and waves because our concepts lack clear boundaries
[Koslicki]
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17436
|
We talk of snow as what stays the same, when it is a heap or drift or expanse
[Koslicki]
|
17435
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Objects do not naturally form countable units
[Koslicki]
|
17433
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We can still count squares, even if they overlap
[Koslicki]
|
14497
|
The clay is just a part of the statue (its matter); the rest consists of its form or structure
[Koslicki]
|
14495
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I aim to put the notion of structure or form back into the concepts of part, whole and object
[Koslicki]
|
14496
|
Structure or form are right at the centre of modern rigorous modes of enquiry
[Koslicki]
|
13266
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Wholes in modern mereology are intended to replace sets, so they closely resemble them
[Koslicki]
|
14498
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For three-dimensionalist parthood must be a three-place relation, including times
[Koslicki]
|
14500
|
Wholes are entities distinct from their parts, and have different properties
[Koslicki]
|
14501
|
'Categorical' properties exist in the actual world, and 'hypothetical' properties in other worlds
[Koslicki]
|
13264
|
If a whole is just a structure, a dinner party wouldn't need the guests to turn up
[Koslicki]
|
13258
|
The 'aggregative' objections says mereology gets existence and location of objects wrong
[Koslicki]
|
13281
|
Wholes are not just their parts; a whole is an entity distinct from the proper parts
[Koslicki]
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13283
|
The parts may be the same type as the whole, like a building made of buildings
[Koslicki]
|
13280
|
Statue and clay differ in modal and temporal properties, and in constitution
[Koslicki]
|
13279
|
There are at least six versions of constitution being identity
[Koslicki]
|
13284
|
Should vernacular classifications ever be counted as natural kind terms?
[Koslicki]
|
13285
|
Natural kinds support inductive inferences, from previous samples to the next one
[Koslicki]
|
13287
|
Concepts for species are either intrinsic structure, or relations like breeding or ancestry
[Koslicki]
|
13286
|
There are apparently no scientific laws concerning biological species
[Koslicki]
|
14504
|
The Kripke/Putnam approach to natural kind terms seems to give them excessive stability
[Koslicki]
|
14505
|
Some questions concern mathematical entities, rather than whole structures
[Koslicki]
|
14506
|
'Roses are red; therefore, roses are colored' seems truth-preserving, but not valid in a system
[Koslicki]
|
13288
|
Consequence is truth-preserving, either despite substitutions, or in all interpretations
[Koslicki]
|
13289
|
Structures have positions, constituent types and number, and some invariable parts
[Koslicki]
|
17312
|
It is more explanatory if you show how a number is constructed from basic entities and relations
[Koslicki]
|
17311
|
Real definitions don't just single out a thing; they must also explain its essence
[Koslicki]
|
17309
|
For Fine, essences are propositions true because of identity, so they are just real definitions
[Koslicki]
|
17313
|
Modern views want essences just to individuate things across worlds and times
[Koslicki]
|
17314
|
The relata of grounding are propositions or facts, but for dependence it is objects and their features
[Koslicki]
|
17315
|
We need a less propositional view of essence, and so must distinguish it clearly from real definitions
[Koslicki]
|
17316
|
We can abstract to a dependent entity by blocking out features of its bearer
[Koslicki]
|
17317
|
A good explanation captures the real-world dependence among the phenomena
[Koslicki]
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