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Single Idea 15120

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived ]

Full Idea

According to Lewis's conception, the causal powers of a property are constituted by its patterned relations to other properties in the particular Humean mosaic that is the actual world.

Gist of Idea

Lewisian properties have powers because of their relationships to other properties

Source

report of David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983]) by John Hawthorne - Causal Structuralism Intro

Book Ref

Hawthorne,John: 'Metaphysical Essays' [OUP 2002], p.211

A Reaction

I just can't grasp this as a serious proposal. Relations cannot be the bottom line in explanation of the world. What are the relata? I take powers to be primitive.

The 23 ideas with the same theme [powers as products of something more basic]:

16740 A power is not a cause, but an aptitude for a cause [Zabarella]
16744 All powers can be explained by obvious features like size, shape and motion of matter [Descartes]
16734 The complete power of an event is just the aggregate of the qualities that produced it [Hobbes]
15974 The essence of whiteness in a man is nothing but the power to produce the idea of whiteness [Locke]
23666 It is obvious that there could not be a power without a subject which possesses it [Reid]
14296 Dispositions are physical states of mechanism; when known, these replace the old disposition term [Quine]
13568 Basic powers may not be explained by structure, if at the bottom level there is no structure [Ellis]
13586 Maybe dispositions can be explained by intrinsic properties or structures [Ellis]
15094 I now deny that properties are cluster of powers, and take causal properties as basic [Shoemaker]
15758 Things have powers in virtue of (which are entailed by) their properties [Shoemaker]
8547 One power can come from different properties; a thing's powers come from its properties [Shoemaker]
8549 Properties are functions producing powers, and powers are functions producing effects [Shoemaker]
15258 Powers are not qualities; they just point to directions of empirical investigation [Harré/Madden]
15554 A disposition needs a causal basis, a property in a certain causal role. Could the disposition be the property? [Lewis]
15463 All dispositions must have causal bases [Lewis]
15120 Lewisian properties have powers because of their relationships to other properties [Lewis, by Hawthorne]
7023 Powers or dispositions are usually seen as caused by lower-level qualities [Heil]
14310 Dispositions are classifications of properties by functional role [Mumford]
14316 If dispositions have several categorical realisations, that makes the two separate [Mumford]
14317 I say the categorical base causes the disposition manifestation [Mumford]
9450 If all properties are potencies, and stimuli and manifestation characterise them, there is a regress [Bird]
9498 The essence of a potency involves relations, e.g. mass, to impressed force and acceleration [Bird]
14557 Powers are not just basic forces, since they combine to make new powers [Mumford/Anjum]