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Single Idea 15123

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties ]

Full Idea

We might say that the causal profile of a property is its essence.

Gist of Idea

Is the causal profile of a property its essence?

Source

John Hawthorne (Causal Structuralism [2001], Intro)

Book Ref

Hawthorne,John: 'Metaphysical Essays' [OUP 2002], p.212


A Reaction

I associate this view with Shoemaker, and find it sympathetic. We always want to know more. What gives rise to these causal powers? Where does explanation end? He notes that you might say some of the powers are non-essential.


The 17 ideas from John Hawthorne

Modern metaphysicians tend to think space-time points are more fundamental than space-time regions [Hawthorne]
A modal can reverse meaning if the context is seen differently, so maybe context is all? [Hawthorne]
If we accept scattered objects such as archipelagos, why not think of cars that way? [Hawthorne]
Four-dimensionalists say instantaneous objects are more fundamental than long-lived ones [Hawthorne]
How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'? [Hawthorne]
We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks [Hawthorne]
Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases [Hawthorne]
Commitment to 'I have a hand' only makes sense in a context where it has been doubted [Hawthorne]
An individual essence is a necessary and sufficient profile for a thing [Hawthorne]
Is the causal profile of a property its essence? [Hawthorne]
Could two different properties have the same causal profile? [Hawthorne]
If properties are more than their powers, we could have two properties with the same power [Hawthorne]
Maybe scientific causation is just generalisation about the patterns [Hawthorne]
A categorical basis could hardly explain a disposition if it had no powers of its own [Hawthorne]
We can treat the structure/form of the world differently from the nodes/matter of the world [Hawthorne]
We only know the mathematical laws, but not much else [Hawthorne]
Our notion of identical sets involves identical members, which needs absolute identity [Hawthorne]