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Single Idea 15126

[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation ]

Full Idea

Perhaps science doesn't need a robust conception of causation, and can get by with thinking of causal laws in a Humean way, as the simplest generalization over the mosaic.

Gist of Idea

Maybe scientific causation is just generalisation about the patterns

Source

John Hawthorne (Causal Structuralism [2001], 1.5)

Book Ref

Hawthorne,John: 'Metaphysical Essays' [OUP 2002], p.219


A Reaction

The Humean view he is referring to is held by David Lewis. That seems a council of defeat. We observe from a distance, but make no attempt to explain.


The 17 ideas from John Hawthorne

Modern metaphysicians tend to think space-time points are more fundamental than space-time regions [Hawthorne]
A modal can reverse meaning if the context is seen differently, so maybe context is all? [Hawthorne]
If we accept scattered objects such as archipelagos, why not think of cars that way? [Hawthorne]
Four-dimensionalists say instantaneous objects are more fundamental than long-lived ones [Hawthorne]
How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'? [Hawthorne]
We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks [Hawthorne]
Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases [Hawthorne]
Commitment to 'I have a hand' only makes sense in a context where it has been doubted [Hawthorne]
An individual essence is a necessary and sufficient profile for a thing [Hawthorne]
Is the causal profile of a property its essence? [Hawthorne]
Could two different properties have the same causal profile? [Hawthorne]
If properties are more than their powers, we could have two properties with the same power [Hawthorne]
Maybe scientific causation is just generalisation about the patterns [Hawthorne]
A categorical basis could hardly explain a disposition if it had no powers of its own [Hawthorne]
We can treat the structure/form of the world differently from the nodes/matter of the world [Hawthorne]
We only know the mathematical laws, but not much else [Hawthorne]
Our notion of identical sets involves identical members, which needs absolute identity [Hawthorne]