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Full Idea
The categorical basis would be a poor explanans for the disposition as explanandum, if the categorical basis did not drag any causal powers along with it.
Gist of Idea
A categorical basis could hardly explain a disposition if it had no powers of its own
Source
John Hawthorne (Causal Structuralism [2001], 2.4)
Book Ref
Hawthorne,John: 'Metaphysical Essays' [OUP 2002], p.223
A Reaction
The idea that the world is explained just by some basic stuff having qualities and relations always strikes me as wrong, because the view of nature is too passive.
Related Ideas
Idea 9490 The categoricalist idea is that a property is only individuated by being itself [Bird]
Idea 14194 Proper ontology should only use categorical (actual) properties, not hypothetical ones [Sider]
| 15123 | Is the causal profile of a property its essence? [Hawthorne] |
| 15122 | Could two different properties have the same causal profile? [Hawthorne] |
| 15121 | An individual essence is a necessary and sufficient profile for a thing [Hawthorne] |
| 15124 | If properties are more than their powers, we could have two properties with the same power [Hawthorne] |
| 15126 | Maybe scientific causation is just generalisation about the patterns [Hawthorne] |
| 15127 | A categorical basis could hardly explain a disposition if it had no powers of its own [Hawthorne] |
| 15128 | We can treat the structure/form of the world differently from the nodes/matter of the world [Hawthorne] |
| 15125 | We only know the mathematical laws, but not much else [Hawthorne] |