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Single Idea 15127

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic ]

Full Idea

The categorical basis would be a poor explanans for the disposition as explanandum, if the categorical basis did not drag any causal powers along with it.

Gist of Idea

A categorical basis could hardly explain a disposition if it had no powers of its own

Source

John Hawthorne (Causal Structuralism [2001], 2.4)

Book Ref

Hawthorne,John: 'Metaphysical Essays' [OUP 2002], p.223

A Reaction

The idea that the world is explained just by some basic stuff having qualities and relations always strikes me as wrong, because the view of nature is too passive.

Related Ideas

Idea 9490 The categoricalist idea is that a property is only individuated by being itself [Bird]

Idea 14194 Proper ontology should only use categorical (actual) properties, not hypothetical ones [Sider]

The 17 ideas from John Hawthorne

14588 Modern metaphysicians tend to think space-time points are more fundamental than space-time regions [Hawthorne]
14589 A modal can reverse meaning if the context is seen differently, so maybe context is all? [Hawthorne]
14590 If we accept scattered objects such as archipelagos, why not think of cars that way? [Hawthorne]
14591 Four-dimensionalists say instantaneous objects are more fundamental than long-lived ones [Hawthorne]
19551 How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'? [Hawthorne]
19552 We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks [Hawthorne]
19554 Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases [Hawthorne]
19553 Commitment to 'I have a hand' only makes sense in a context where it has been doubted [Hawthorne]
15121 An individual essence is a necessary and sufficient profile for a thing [Hawthorne]
15123 Is the causal profile of a property its essence? [Hawthorne]
15122 Could two different properties have the same causal profile? [Hawthorne]
15124 If properties are more than their powers, we could have two properties with the same power [Hawthorne]
15126 Maybe scientific causation is just generalisation about the patterns [Hawthorne]
15127 A categorical basis could hardly explain a disposition if it had no powers of its own [Hawthorne]
15128 We can treat the structure/form of the world differently from the nodes/matter of the world [Hawthorne]
15125 We only know the mathematical laws, but not much else [Hawthorne]
8970 Our notion of identical sets involves identical members, which needs absolute identity [Hawthorne]