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Single Idea 15128
[filed under theme 9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / b. Form as principle
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Full Idea
It does not seem altogether arbitrary to treat the structure of the world (the 'form' of the world) in a different way to the nodes in the structure (the 'matter' of the world).
Gist of Idea
We can treat the structure/form of the world differently from the nodes/matter of the world
Source
John Hawthorne (Causal Structuralism [2001], 2.5)
Book Ref
Hawthorne,John: 'Metaphysical Essays' [OUP 2002], p.223
A Reaction
An interesting contemporary spin put on Aristotle's original view. Hawthorne is presenting the Aristotle account as a sort of 'structuralism' about nature.
The
17 ideas
from John Hawthorne
14588
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Modern metaphysicians tend to think space-time points are more fundamental than space-time regions
[Hawthorne]
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14589
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A modal can reverse meaning if the context is seen differently, so maybe context is all?
[Hawthorne]
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14590
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If we accept scattered objects such as archipelagos, why not think of cars that way?
[Hawthorne]
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14591
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Four-dimensionalists say instantaneous objects are more fundamental than long-lived ones
[Hawthorne]
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19551
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How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'?
[Hawthorne]
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19552
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We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks
[Hawthorne]
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19554
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Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases
[Hawthorne]
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19553
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Commitment to 'I have a hand' only makes sense in a context where it has been doubted
[Hawthorne]
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15121
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An individual essence is a necessary and sufficient profile for a thing
[Hawthorne]
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15123
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Is the causal profile of a property its essence?
[Hawthorne]
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15122
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Could two different properties have the same causal profile?
[Hawthorne]
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15124
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If properties are more than their powers, we could have two properties with the same power
[Hawthorne]
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15126
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Maybe scientific causation is just generalisation about the patterns
[Hawthorne]
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15127
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A categorical basis could hardly explain a disposition if it had no powers of its own
[Hawthorne]
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15128
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We can treat the structure/form of the world differently from the nodes/matter of the world
[Hawthorne]
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15125
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We only know the mathematical laws, but not much else
[Hawthorne]
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8970
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Our notion of identical sets involves identical members, which needs absolute identity
[Hawthorne]
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