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Full Idea
It does not seem altogether arbitrary to treat the structure of the world (the 'form' of the world) in a different way to the nodes in the structure (the 'matter' of the world).
Gist of Idea
We can treat the structure/form of the world differently from the nodes/matter of the world
Source
John Hawthorne (Causal Structuralism [2001], 2.5)
Book Ref
Hawthorne,John: 'Metaphysical Essays' [OUP 2002], p.223
A Reaction
An interesting contemporary spin put on Aristotle's original view. Hawthorne is presenting the Aristotle account as a sort of 'structuralism' about nature.
| 15123 | Is the causal profile of a property its essence? [Hawthorne] |
| 15122 | Could two different properties have the same causal profile? [Hawthorne] |
| 15121 | An individual essence is a necessary and sufficient profile for a thing [Hawthorne] |
| 15124 | If properties are more than their powers, we could have two properties with the same power [Hawthorne] |
| 15126 | Maybe scientific causation is just generalisation about the patterns [Hawthorne] |
| 15127 | A categorical basis could hardly explain a disposition if it had no powers of its own [Hawthorne] |
| 15128 | We can treat the structure/form of the world differently from the nodes/matter of the world [Hawthorne] |
| 15125 | We only know the mathematical laws, but not much else [Hawthorne] |