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Single Idea 15129

[filed under theme 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism ]

Full Idea

If two worlds differ in what they represent de re concerning some individual, but do not differ qualitatively in any way, I shall call that a haecceitist difference. Haecceitism, then, says there are at least some haecceitist differences between worlds.

Gist of Idea

Haecceitism implies de re differences but qualitative identity

Source

David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986], 4.4)

Book Ref

Lewis,David: 'On the Plurality of Worlds' [Blackwell 2001], p.221


A Reaction

Lewis bases this view on Kaplan. My brief summary of this is that 'identity may be hidden'. If all electrons are different, what distinguishes them?


The 16 ideas with the same theme [indistinguishable worlds might still have different objects]:

Leibniz is some form of haecceitist [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
Two objects may only differ in being different [Wittgenstein]
Adams says anti-haecceitism reduces all thisness to suchness [Adams,RM, by Stalnaker]
Haecceitism may or may not involve some logical connection to essence [Adams,RM, by Mackie,P]
Moderate Haecceitism says transworld identities are primitive, but connected to qualities [Adams,RM]
'Haecceitism' says that sameness or difference of individuals is independent of appearances [Kaplan]
'Haecceitism' is common thisness under dissimilarity, or distinct thisnesses under resemblance [Kaplan]
If quantification into modal contexts is legitimate, that seems to imply some form of haecceitism [Kaplan]
Anti-haecceitism says there is no more to an individual than meeting some qualitative conditions [Stalnaker]
Extreme haecceitists could say I might have been a poached egg, but it is too remote to consider [Lewis, by Mackie,P]
Haecceitism implies de re differences but qualitative identity [Lewis]
Extreme haecceitism says you might possibly be a poached egg [Lewis]
Haecceitism attributes to each individual a primitive identity or thisness [Forbes,G]
We believe in thisnesses, because we reject bizarre possibilities as not being about that individual [Forbes,G]
Haecceitism says identity is independent of qualities and without essence [Bird]
The theory of 'haecceitism' does not need commitment to individual haecceities [Mackie,P]