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Full Idea
The truthmaker principle seems compelling, because if a proposition is true, something must be different from a world in which it is false. The principle makes this specific, by treating 'something' as a quantifier binding a variable in name position.
Gist of Idea
The truthmaker principle requires some specific named thing to make the difference
Source
Timothy Williamson (Truthmakers and Converse Barcan Formula [1999], §2)
Book Ref
-: 'Dialectica' [-], p.257
A Reaction
See Williamson for an examination of the logical implications of this. The point is that the principle seems to require some very specific 'thing', which may be asking too much. For a start, it might be the absence of a thing.
| 18367 | A true existence statement has its truth caused by the existence of the thing [Aristotle] |
| 15134 | The truthmaker principle requires some specific named thing to make the difference [Williamson] |
| 18355 | What matters is truth-making (not truth-makers) [David] |
| 15012 | Orthodox truthmaker theories make entities fundamental, but that is poor for explanation [Sider] |
| 14395 | If a ball changes from red to white, Truthmaker says some thing must make the change true [Merricks] |
| 14398 | Truthmaker says if an entity is removed, some nonexistence truthmaker must replace it [Merricks] |
| 14403 | If Truthmaker says each truth is made by the existence of something, the theory had de re modality at is core [Merricks] |
| 13247 | A truthmaker is an object which entails a sentence [Beall/Restall] |