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Single Idea 15141

[filed under theme 3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 7. Making Modal Truths ]

Full Idea

Friends of the truthmaker principle should reject the Kripke semantics of varying domains.

Gist of Idea

Truthmaker is incompatible with modal semantics of varying domains

Source

Timothy Williamson (Truthmakers and Converse Barcan Formula [1999], §3)

Book Ref

-: 'Dialectica' [-], p.266


A Reaction

See other ideas from this paper to get a sense of what that is about.


The 12 ideas from 'Truthmakers and Converse Barcan Formula'

If metaphysical possibility is not a contingent matter, then S5 seems to suit it best [Williamson]
A thing can't be the only necessary existent, because its singleton set would be as well [Williamson]
The truthmaker principle requires some specific named thing to make the difference [Williamson]
If the domain of propositional quantification is constant, the Barcan formulas hold [Williamson]
Not all quantification is objectual or substitutional [Williamson]
Substitutional quantification is metaphysical neutral, and equivalent to a disjunction of instances [Williamson]
If 'fact' is a noun, can we name the fact that dogs bark 'Mary'? [Williamson]
Our ability to count objects across possibilities favours the Barcan formulas [Williamson]
Converse Barcan: could something fail to meet a condition, if everything meets that condition? [Williamson]
Truthmaker is incompatible with modal semantics of varying domains [Williamson]
The converse Barcan formula will not allow contingent truths to have truthmakers [Williamson]
Not all quantification is either objectual or substitutional [Williamson]