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Single Idea 15146

[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds ]

Full Idea

Many of the kinds we theorize about and experiment on today simply do not have essences. We can distinguish 'essence kinds', such as electrons, and 'cluster kinds', such as biological species.

Gist of Idea

Some kinds, such as electrons, have essences, but 'cluster kinds' do not

Source

Anjan Chakravarrty (Inessential Aristotle: Powers without Essences [2012], 2)


A Reaction

This is an important point for essentialists. He offers a strict criterion, in Idea 15145, for mind membership, but we might allow species to have essences by just relaxing the criteria a bit, and acknowledging some vagueness, especially over time.

Related Idea

Idea 15147 Cluster kinds are explained simply by sharing some properties, not by an 'essence' [Chakravartty]


The 6 ideas from 'Inessential Aristotle: Powers without Essences'

Explanation of causal phenomena concerns essential kinds - but also lack of them [Chakravartty]
Some kinds, such as electrons, have essences, but 'cluster kinds' do not [Chakravartty]
A kind essence is the necessary and sufficient properties for membership of a class [Chakravartty]
Cluster kinds are explained simply by sharing some properties, not by an 'essence' [Chakravartty]
Many causal laws do not refer to kinds, but only to properties [Chakravartty]
Powers give explanations, without being necessary for some class membership [Chakravartty]