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Full Idea
The fact that members of some cluster kinds are subjects of causal generalizations reflects the degree to which they share causally efficacious properties, not the fact that they may be composed of essence kinds per se.
Gist of Idea
Cluster kinds are explained simply by sharing some properties, not by an 'essence'
Source
Anjan Chakravarrty (Inessential Aristotle: Powers without Essences [2012], 2)
A Reaction
I think this is right. I am a fan of individual essences, but not of kind essences. I take kinds, and kind explanations, to be straightforward inductive generalisations from individuals. Extreme stabilities give the illusion of a kind essence.
Related Idea
Idea 15146 Some kinds, such as electrons, have essences, but 'cluster kinds' do not [Chakravartty]
| 15144 | Explanation of causal phenomena concerns essential kinds - but also lack of them [Chakravartty] |
| 15146 | Some kinds, such as electrons, have essences, but 'cluster kinds' do not [Chakravartty] |
| 15145 | A kind essence is the necessary and sufficient properties for membership of a class [Chakravartty] |
| 15147 | Cluster kinds are explained simply by sharing some properties, not by an 'essence' [Chakravartty] |
| 15151 | Many causal laws do not refer to kinds, but only to properties [Chakravartty] |
| 15148 | Powers give explanations, without being necessary for some class membership [Chakravartty] |