more on this theme | more from this thinker
Full Idea
The truth conditions provided by Tarski's theories (based on references of subsentential constituents) are too weak to determine meanings, because they lacked context-sensitivity and various forms of intensionality.
Gist of Idea
Tarski's account of truth-conditions is too weak to determine meanings
Source
Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], Intro)
Book Ref
Soames,Scott: 'Philosophy of Language' [Princeton 2010], p.2
A Reaction
Interesting. This suggests that stronger modern axiomatic theories of truth might give a sufficient basis for a truth conditions theory of meaning. Soames says possible worlds semantics was an attempt to improve things.
| 15152 | To study meaning, study truth conditions, on the basis of syntax, and representation by the parts [Soames] |
| 15153 | Tarski's account of truth-conditions is too weak to determine meanings [Soames] |
| 15154 | We should use cognitive states to explain representational propositions, not vice versa [Soames] |
| 15156 | The universal and existential quantifiers were chosen to suit mathematics [Soames] |
| 15157 | Recognising the definite description 'the man' as a quantifier phrase, not a singular term, is a real insight [Soames] |
| 15158 | Indefinite descriptions are quantificational in subject position, but not in predicate position [Soames] |
| 15163 | The interest of quantified modal logic is its metaphysical necessity and essentialism [Soames] |
| 15161 | There are more metaphysically than logically necessary truths [Soames] |
| 15162 | We understand metaphysical necessity intuitively, from ordinary life [Soames] |