more from this thinker     |     more from this text

Single Idea 15154

[filed under theme 19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions ]

Full Idea

Instead of explaining the representationality of sentences and cognitive states in terms of propositions, we must explain the representationality of propositions in terms of the representationality of the relevant cognitive states.

Gist of Idea

We should use cognitive states to explain representational propositions, not vice versa

Source

Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], Intro)

Book Ref

Soames,Scott: 'Philosophy of Language' [Princeton 2010], p.3

A Reaction

Music to my ears. I am bewildered by this Russellian notion of a 'proposition' as some abstract entity floating around in the world waiting to be expressed. The vaguer word 'facts' (and false facts?) will cover that. It's Frege's fault.

The 20 ideas with the same theme [propositions as features of thought]:

13763 Spoken sounds vary between people, but are signs of affections of soul, which are the same for all [Aristotle]
23404 Words are for meaning, and once you have that you can forget the words [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
6024 Thought is unambiguous, and you should stick to what the speaker thinks they are saying [Diod.Cronus, by Gellius]
23322 Humans have rational impressions, which are conceptual, and are true or false [Stoic school, by Frede,M]
9105 Some concepts for propositions exist only in the mind, and in no language [William of Ockham]
6718 I can't really go wrong if I stick to wordless thought [Berkeley]
6435 You can believe the meaning of a sentence without thinking of the words [Russell]
22307 Propositions don't name facts, because two opposed propositions can match one fact [Russell]
23490 A thought is mental constituents that relate to reality as words do [Wittgenstein]
13981 Several people can believe one thing, or make the same mistake, or share one delusion [Ryle]
13987 We may think in French, but we don't know or believe in French [Ryle]
9084 Propositions can't just be in brains, because 'there are no human beings' might be true [Plantinga]
13943 We can attribute 'true' and 'false' to whatever it was that was said [Cartwright,R]
13946 To assert that p, it is neither necessary nor sufficient to utter some particular words [Cartwright,R]
15154 We should use cognitive states to explain representational propositions, not vice versa [Soames]
6632 The same proposition provides contents for the that-clause of an utterance and a belief [Lowe]
9133 Propositions are what settle problems of ambiguity in sentences [Sorensen]
8484 If two people believe the same proposition, this implies the existence of propositions [Orenstein]
22250 There are speakers' thoughts and hearers' thoughts, but no further thought attached to the utterance [Recanati]
16298 We need propositions to ascribe the same beliefs to people with different languages [Halbach]