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Single Idea 15158

[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / a. Descriptions ]

Full Idea

The indefinite description in 'A man will meet you' is naturally treated as quantificational, but an occurrence in predicative position, in 'Jones is not a philosopher', doesn't have a natural quantificational counterpart.

Gist of Idea

Indefinite descriptions are quantificational in subject position, but not in predicate position

Source

Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], 1.23)

Book Ref

Soames,Scott: 'Philosophy of Language' [Princeton 2010], p.24

The 17 ideas from Scott Soames

13966 Analytic philosophy loved the necessary a priori analytic, linguistic modality, and rigour [Soames]
13968 Kripkean possible worlds are abstract maximal states in which the real world could have been [Soames]
13969 Kripkean essential properties and relations are necessary, in all genuinely possible worlds [Soames]
13972 Two-dimensionalism reinstates descriptivism, and reconnects necessity and apriority to analyticity [Soames]
13973 A key achievement of Kripke is showing that important modalities are not linguistic in source [Soames]
13974 If philosophy is analysis of meaning, available to all competent speakers, what's left for philosophers? [Soames]
15154 We should use cognitive states to explain representational propositions, not vice versa [Soames]
15152 To study meaning, study truth conditions, on the basis of syntax, and representation by the parts [Soames]
15153 Tarski's account of truth-conditions is too weak to determine meanings [Soames]
15156 The universal and existential quantifiers were chosen to suit mathematics [Soames]
15157 Recognising the definite description 'the man' as a quantifier phrase, not a singular term, is a real insight [Soames]
15158 Indefinite descriptions are quantificational in subject position, but not in predicate position [Soames]
15162 We understand metaphysical necessity intuitively, from ordinary life [Soames]
15161 There are more metaphysically than logically necessary truths [Soames]
15163 The interest of quantified modal logic is its metaphysical necessity and essentialism [Soames]
13964 Semantic content is a proposition made of sentence constituents (not some set of circumstances) [Soames]
13965 Semantics as theory of meaning and semantics as truth-based logical consequence are very different [Soames]