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Single Idea 15163

[filed under theme 4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic ]

Full Idea

The chief philosophical interest in quantified modal logic lies with metaphysical necessity, essentialism, and the nontrivial modal de re.

Gist of Idea

The interest of quantified modal logic is its metaphysical necessity and essentialism

Source

Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], 3.1)

Book Ref

Soames,Scott: 'Philosophy of Language' [Princeton 2010], p.54


The 17 ideas from Scott Soames

Analytic philosophy loved the necessary a priori analytic, linguistic modality, and rigour [Soames]
Kripkean possible worlds are abstract maximal states in which the real world could have been [Soames]
Kripkean essential properties and relations are necessary, in all genuinely possible worlds [Soames]
Two-dimensionalism reinstates descriptivism, and reconnects necessity and apriority to analyticity [Soames]
A key achievement of Kripke is showing that important modalities are not linguistic in source [Soames]
If philosophy is analysis of meaning, available to all competent speakers, what's left for philosophers? [Soames]
We should use cognitive states to explain representational propositions, not vice versa [Soames]
To study meaning, study truth conditions, on the basis of syntax, and representation by the parts [Soames]
Tarski's account of truth-conditions is too weak to determine meanings [Soames]
The universal and existential quantifiers were chosen to suit mathematics [Soames]
Recognising the definite description 'the man' as a quantifier phrase, not a singular term, is a real insight [Soames]
Indefinite descriptions are quantificational in subject position, but not in predicate position [Soames]
We understand metaphysical necessity intuitively, from ordinary life [Soames]
There are more metaphysically than logically necessary truths [Soames]
The interest of quantified modal logic is its metaphysical necessity and essentialism [Soames]
Semantic content is a proposition made of sentence constituents (not some set of circumstances) [Soames]
Semantics as theory of meaning and semantics as truth-based logical consequence are very different [Soames]