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Single Idea 15169

[filed under theme 1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual ]

Full Idea

Metaphysics, for the conventionalist, is not a matter of trying to see deeply into the structure of mind-independent reality, but of trying to clarify the way we actually speak and think, and perhaps negotiating ways of doing this to our best advantage.

Gist of Idea

Metaphysics is clarifying how we speak and think (and possibly improving it)

Source

Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.1)

Book Ref

Sidelle,Alan: 'Necessity, Essence and Individuation' [Cornell 1989], p.17

A Reaction

Note that he is still allowing space for 'revisionary' as well as for 'descriptive' metaphysics. I can't wholly accept this, as I really do think we can have some deep insights into reality, but Sidelle is articulating a large part of the truth.

The 22 ideas from 'Necessity, Essence and Individuation'

15032 Necessary a posteriori is conventional for necessity and nonmodal for a posteriority [Sidelle, by Sider]
15167 Empiricism explores necessities and concept-limits by imagining negations of truths [Sidelle]
15165 A priori knowledge is entirely of analytic truths [Sidelle]
15168 That water is essentially H2O in some way concerns how we use 'water' [Sidelle]
15166 Causal reference seems to get directly at the object, thus leaving its nature open [Sidelle]
15169 Metaphysics is clarifying how we speak and think (and possibly improving it) [Sidelle]
15164 We seem to base necessities on thought experiments and imagination [Sidelle]
15172 Clearly, essential predications express necessary properties [Sidelle]
15173 That the essence of water is its microstructure is a convention, not a discovery [Sidelle]
15171 The necessary a posteriori is statements either of identity or of essence [Sidelle]
15176 The individuals and kinds involved in modality are also a matter of convention [Sidelle]
15174 A thing doesn't need transworld identity prior to rigid reference - that could be a convention of the reference [Sidelle]
15175 Evaluation of de dicto modalities does not depend on the identity of its objects [Sidelle]
15180 There doesn't seem to be anything in the actual world that can determine modal facts [Sidelle]
15181 Being a deepest explanatory feature is an actual, not a modal property [Sidelle]
15177 Contradictoriness limits what is possible and what is imaginable [Sidelle]
15179 To know empirical necessities, we need empirical facts, plus conventions about which are necessary [Sidelle]
15178 Can anything in science reveal the necessity of what it discovers? [Sidelle]
15182 Because some entities overlap, reference must have analytic individuation principles [Sidelle]
15184 Causal reference presupposes essentialism if it refers to modally extended entities [Sidelle]
15185 We aren't clear about 'same stuff as this', so a principle of individuation is needed to identify it [Sidelle]
15183 'Dthat' operates to make a singular term into a rigid term [Sidelle]