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Single Idea 15170

[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 3. Knowing Kinds ]

Full Idea

Our ranking, and distinguishing natural substances into species consists in the nominal essences the mind makes, and not in the real essences to be found in things themselves.

Gist of Idea

We distinguish species by their nominal essence, not by their real essence

Source

John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 3.06.11)

Book Ref

Locke,John: 'Essay Concerning Human Understanding', ed/tr. Nidditch,P.H. [OUP 1979], p.444


A Reaction

Note that, as far as I can see, Locke never denies the existence of real essences, or even that we might occasionally know them. He is here merely describing, fairly accurately, I think, his empiricist view of how these categories have come about.

Related Idea

Idea 12531 Nominal Essence is the abstract idea to which a name is attached [Locke]


The 9 ideas with the same theme [how and how far we can know natural kinds]:

We distinguish species by their nominal essence, not by their real essence [Locke]
You can't base kinds just on resemblance, because chains of resemblance are a muddle [Quine]
There might be uninstantiated natural kinds, such as transuranic elements which have never occurred [Ellis]
Lawlike propensities are enough to individuate natural kinds [Wiggins]
One sample of gold is enough, but one tree doesn't give the height of trees [Gelman]
In the Kripke-Putnam view only nuclear physicists can know natural kinds [Bird]
Darwinism suggests that we should have a native ability to detect natural kinds [Bird]
Explanation by kinds and by clusters of properties just express the stability of reality [Ladyman/Ross]
Natural kinds support inductive inferences, from previous samples to the next one [Koslicki]