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Single Idea 15184

[filed under theme 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence ]

Full Idea

Even if the causal theory of reference proper does not presuppose essentialism, it does presuppose essentialism if it is to be an account of reference to modally extended entities.

Gist of Idea

Causal reference presupposes essentialism if it refers to modally extended entities

Source

Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.6)

Book Ref

Sidelle,Alan: 'Necessity, Essence and Individuation' [Cornell 1989], p.190


The 22 ideas from Alan Sidelle

Necessary a posteriori is conventional for necessity and nonmodal for a posteriority [Sidelle, by Sider]
Empiricism explores necessities and concept-limits by imagining negations of truths [Sidelle]
A priori knowledge is entirely of analytic truths [Sidelle]
That water is essentially H2O in some way concerns how we use 'water' [Sidelle]
Causal reference seems to get directly at the object, thus leaving its nature open [Sidelle]
Metaphysics is clarifying how we speak and think (and possibly improving it) [Sidelle]
We seem to base necessities on thought experiments and imagination [Sidelle]
Clearly, essential predications express necessary properties [Sidelle]
That the essence of water is its microstructure is a convention, not a discovery [Sidelle]
The necessary a posteriori is statements either of identity or of essence [Sidelle]
The individuals and kinds involved in modality are also a matter of convention [Sidelle]
A thing doesn't need transworld identity prior to rigid reference - that could be a convention of the reference [Sidelle]
Evaluation of de dicto modalities does not depend on the identity of its objects [Sidelle]
There doesn't seem to be anything in the actual world that can determine modal facts [Sidelle]
Being a deepest explanatory feature is an actual, not a modal property [Sidelle]
Contradictoriness limits what is possible and what is imaginable [Sidelle]
To know empirical necessities, we need empirical facts, plus conventions about which are necessary [Sidelle]
Can anything in science reveal the necessity of what it discovers? [Sidelle]
Because some entities overlap, reference must have analytic individuation principles [Sidelle]
We aren't clear about 'same stuff as this', so a principle of individuation is needed to identify it [Sidelle]
Causal reference presupposes essentialism if it refers to modally extended entities [Sidelle]
'Dthat' operates to make a singular term into a rigid term [Sidelle]