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Single Idea 15192

[filed under theme 27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / e. Tensed (A) series ]

Full Idea

We appear to share a common now, but not a common here.

Gist of Idea

We share a common now, but not a common here

Source

Robin Le Poidevin (Intro to 'Questions of Time and Tense' [1998], 2)

Book Ref

'Questions of Time and Tense', ed/tr. Le Poidevin,R [OUP 2002], p.5

A Reaction

Personally I take this to be quite a strong argument against the simplistic view that there is just something called 'spacetime', with no distinction of dimensions.

The 48 ideas from Robin Le Poidevin

6866 It is disturbing if we become unreal when we die, but if time is unreal, then we remain real after death [Le Poidevin]
6865 A-theory says past, present, future and flow exist; B-theory says this just reports our perspective [Le Poidevin]
6867 Existentialism focuses on freedom and self-making, and insertion into the world [Le Poidevin]
15186 In the tenseless view, all times are equally real, so statements of the future have truth-values [Le Poidevin]
15187 It is claimed that the tense view entails the unreality of both future and past [Le Poidevin]
15188 If things don't persist through time, then change makes no sense [Le Poidevin]
15189 Things which have ceased change their A-series position; things that persist change their B-series position [Le Poidevin]
15191 At the very least, minds themselves seem to be tensed [Le Poidevin]
15192 We share a common now, but not a common here [Le Poidevin]
15190 Evil can't be an illusion, because then the illusion that there is evil would be evil [Le Poidevin]
15193 The new tenseless theory offers indexical truth-conditions, instead of a reductive analysis [Le Poidevin]
15195 If the future is not real, we don't seem to have any obligation to future individuals [Le Poidevin]
15196 God being inside or outside of time both raise a group of difficult problems [Le Poidevin]
15197 Fiction seems to lack a tensed perspective, and offers an example of tenseless language [Le Poidevin]
15198 In the B-series, time-positions are unchanging; in the A-series they change (from future to present to past) [Le Poidevin]
15205 Tensed theorists typically try to reduce the tenseless to the tensed [Le Poidevin]
15206 It is the view of the future that really decides between tensed and tenseless views of time [Le Poidevin]
15207 We want illuminating theories, rather than coherent theories [Le Poidevin]
22919 A thing which makes no difference seems unlikely to exist [Le Poidevin]
22917 Since nothing occurs in a temporal vacuum, there is no way to measure its length [Le Poidevin]
22921 Temporal vacuums would be unexperienced, unmeasured, and unending [Le Poidevin]
22922 We can identify unoccupied points in space, so they must exist [Le Poidevin]
22923 Absolute space explains actual and potential positions, and geometrical truths [Le Poidevin]
22924 If spatial points exist, then they must be stationary, by definition [Le Poidevin]
22928 For relationists moving an object beyond the edge of space creates new space [Le Poidevin]
22927 The logical properties of causation are asymmetry, transitivity and irreflexivity [Le Poidevin]
22926 In addition to causal explanations, they can also be inferential, or definitional, or purposive [Le Poidevin]
22925 The present is the past/future boundary, so the first moment of time was not present [Le Poidevin]
22937 If the present could have diverse pasts, then past truths can't have present truthmakers [Le Poidevin]
22938 To say that the past causes the present needs them both to be equally real [Le Poidevin]
22934 Time can't speed up or slow down, so it doesn't seem to be a 'process' [Le Poidevin]
22932 We don't just describe a time as 'now' from a private viewpoint, but as a fact about the world [Le Poidevin]
22931 We distinguish time from space, because it passes, and it has a unique present moment [Le Poidevin]
22939 The B-series doesn't seem to allow change [Le Poidevin]
22940 If the B-universe is eternal, why am I trapped in a changing moment of it? [Le Poidevin]
22944 The primitive parts of time are intervals, not instants [Le Poidevin]
22942 If time is infinitely divisible, then the present must be infinitely short [Le Poidevin]
22943 Instantaneous motion is an intrinsic disposition to be elsewhere [Le Poidevin]
22941 How could a timeless God know what time it is? So could God be both timeless and omniscient? [Le Poidevin]
22945 The dynamic view of motion says it is primitive, and not reducible to objects, properties and times [Le Poidevin]
22946 The multiverse is distinct time-series, as well as spaces [Le Poidevin]
22947 An ordered series can be undirected, but time favours moving from earlier to later [Le Poidevin]
22952 If time's arrow is causal, how can there be non-simultaneous events that are causally unconnected? [Le Poidevin]
22953 Time's arrow is not causal if there is no temporal gap between cause and effect [Le Poidevin]
22951 If time's arrow is psychological then different minds can impose different orders on events [Le Poidevin]
22948 There are Thermodynamic, Psychological and Causal arrows of time [Le Poidevin]
22949 Presumably if time's arrow is thermodynamic then time ends when entropy is complete [Le Poidevin]
22950 If time is thermodynamic then entropy is necessary - but the theory says it is probable [Le Poidevin]