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Full Idea
If the future is unreal, future individuals are ontologically problematic. Any apparent obligations towards them cannot, it seems, have an object.
Gist of Idea
If the future is not real, we don't seem to have any obligation to future individuals
Source
Robin Le Poidevin (Intro to 'Questions of Time and Tense' [1998], 5)
Book Ref
'Questions of Time and Tense', ed/tr. Le Poidevin,R [OUP 2002], p.8
A Reaction
I certainly 'feel' obligations to the future, but I am not sure whether I 'have' them. How far into the future do the extend? Should I care if homo sapiens is replaced by a different dominant species?
1702 | Things may be necessary once they occur, but not be unconditionally necessary [Aristotle] |
5980 | How can ten days ahead be a short time, if it doesn't exist? [Augustine] |
8160 | The present and past exist, but the future does not [Broad, by Dummett] |
14609 | We could say present and past exist, but not future, so that each event adds to the total history [Broad] |
9666 | It is quite implausible that the future is unreal, as that would terminate everything [Lewis] |
15195 | If the future is not real, we don't seem to have any obligation to future individuals [Le Poidevin] |
14722 | Between presentism and eternalism is the 'growing block' view - the past is real, the future is not [Sider] |
17961 | Growing block has a subjective present and a growing edge - but these could come apart [Merricks, by PG] |
14610 | Neither 'moving spotlight' nor 'growing block' views explain why we care what is present or past [Zimmerman,DW] |
14015 | No-Futurists believe in past and present, but not future, and say the world grows as facts increase [Bourne] |
22991 | How can we know this is the present moment, if other times are real? [Baron/Miller] |
22992 | If we are actually in the past then we shouldn't experience time passing [Baron/Miller] |