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Single Idea 15204
[filed under theme 27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / c. Tenses and time
]
Full Idea
In the new tenseless theory, no tensed token sentence can be equivalent to a tenseless token, because the former, unlike the latter, draws attention to the context in which it is tokened.
Gist of Idea
Actual tensed sentences cannot be tenseless, because they can cite their own context
Source
report of John Perry (The Problem of the Essential Indexical [1979]) by Robin Le Poidevin - Past, Present and Future of Debate about Tense 3 a
Book Ref
'Questions of Time and Tense', ed/tr. Le Poidevin,R [OUP 2002], p.29
A Reaction
So the problem about indexicals was worrying fans of the tenseless B-series view of time (and so it should). I'm inclined to translate sentences containing indexicals into their actual propositions, which tend to avoid them. 'Time/person of utterance'.
The
22 ideas
from John Perry
4885
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Identity is a very weak relation, which doesn't require interdefinability, or shared properties
[Perry]
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4884
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Brain states must be in my head, and yet the pain seems to be in my hand
[Perry]
|
4887
|
We try to cause other things to occur by causing mental events to occur
[Perry]
|
4888
|
It seems plausible that many animals have experiences without knowing about them
[Perry]
|
4889
|
Although we may classify ideas by content, we individuate them differently, as their content can change
[Perry]
|
4890
|
A sharp analytic/synthetic line can rarely be drawn, but some concepts are central to thought
[Perry]
|
4891
|
If epiphenomenalism just says mental events are effects but not causes, it is consistent with physicalism
[Perry]
|
4892
|
If physicalists stick with identity (not supervenience), Martian pain will not be like ours
[Perry]
|
4901
|
Truth has to be correspondence to facts, and a match between relations of ideas and relations in the world
[Perry]
|
4896
|
The intension of an expression is a function from possible worlds to an appropriate extension
[Perry]
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4900
|
Prior to Kripke, the mind-brain identity theory usually claimed that the identity was contingent
[Perry]
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4899
|
Possible worlds thinking has clarified the logic of modality, but is problematic in epistemology
[Perry]
|
4898
|
Possible worlds are indices for a language, or concrete realities, or abstract possibilities
[Perry]
|
4897
|
A proposition is a set of possible worlds for which its intension delivers truth
[Perry]
|
15203
|
Tense is essential for thought and action
[Perry, by Le Poidevin]
|
15204
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Actual tensed sentences cannot be tenseless, because they can cite their own context
[Perry, by Le Poidevin]
|
12149
|
Indexicals are a problem for beliefs being just subject-proposition relations
[Perry]
|
12151
|
If we replace 'I' in sentences about me, they are different beliefs and explanations of behaviour
[Perry]
|
18412
|
Indexicals individuate certain belief states, helping in explanation and prediction
[Perry]
|
12150
|
Indexicals reveal big problems with the traditional idea of a proposition
[Perry]
|
16391
|
Indexical thoughts are about themselves, and ascribe properties to themselves
[Perry, by Recanati]
|
12155
|
Statements of 'relative identity' are really statements of resemblance
[Perry]
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