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Single Idea 15217

[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation ]

Full Idea

Efficient causes comprise both the presence of stimuli which activate a quiescent individual, and the absence or removal of constraints upon an individual already in a state of activity.

Gist of Idea

Efficient causes combine stimulus to individuals, absence of contraints on activity

Source

Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 1.II.B)

Book Ref

Harré,R/Madden,E.H.: 'Causal Powers: A Theory of Natural Necessity' [Blackwell 1975], p.12


A Reaction

This is part of an account of causation in term of 'powers', with which I agree. Before you object, there is always going to be something about causation which is mind boggling weird, and probably leaves even God bewildered.


The 19 ideas with the same theme [analysis of situation that leads to an event]:

We exercise to be fit, but need fitness to exercise [Aristotle]
Causes are either equal to the effect, or they link equally with other causes, or they contribute slightly [Sext.Empiricus]
There must be at least as much in the cause as there is in the effect [Descartes]
An effect needs a sufficient and necessary cause [Hobbes]
For Hume a constant conjunction is both necessary and sufficient for causation [Hume, by Crane]
A cause is the total of all the conditions which inevitably produce the result [Mill]
Causes are either sufficient, or necessary, or necessitated, or contingent upon [Ducasse]
When a brick and a canary-song hit a window, we ignore the canary if we are interested in the breakage [Ducasse]
We must further analyse conditions for causation, into quantifiers or modal concepts [Wright,GHv]
Since Mill causation has usually been explained by necessary and sufficient conditions [Anscombe]
Necessity and sufficiency are best suited to properties and generic events, not individual events [Kim on Mackie]
A cause is part of a wider set of conditions which suffices for its effect [Mackie, by Crane]
Necessary conditions are like counterfactuals, and sufficient conditions are like factual conditionals [Mackie]
The INUS account interprets single events, and sequences, causally, without laws being known [Mackie]
Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity [Davidson]
Efficient causes combine stimulus to individuals, absence of contraints on activity [Harré/Madden]
Are causes sufficient for the event, or necessary, or both? [Sosa/Tooley]
A totality of conditions necessary for an occurrence is usually held to be jointly sufficient for it [Sanford]
Causal overdetermination is either actual overdetermination, or pre-emption, or the fail-safe case [Lowe]