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Single Idea 15220

[filed under theme 9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change ]

Full Idea

Talk about particulars remaining the same and yet lacking their usual capacities and powers is at once to assert and deny that a certain object or sample of material has a given nature.

Gist of Idea

To say something remains the same but lacks its capacities and powers seems a contradiction

Source

Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 1.II.C)

Book Ref

Harré,R/Madden,E.H.: 'Causal Powers: A Theory of Natural Necessity' [Blackwell 1975], p.13

A Reaction

They imply that this is a contradiction, and hence impossible. So what do we say about something in which the powers fade? Do they both retain and lose their identity? Or can we separate essence from identity?? Aha!

Related Idea

Idea 15221 The relation between what a thing is and what it can do or undergo relate by natural necessity [Harré/Madden]

The 17 ideas with the same theme [how identity fares when an object's properties change]:

16159 For animate things, only the form, not the matter or properties, must persist through change [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
16173 Coming to be is by shape-change, addition, subtraction, composition or alteration [Aristotle]
17042 Natural things are their own source of stability through change [Aristotle]
16059 Change of matter doesn't destroy identity - in Dion and Theon change is a condition of identity [Chrysippus, by Long/Sedley]
1330 If a republic can retain identity through many changes, so can an individual [Hume]
1321 If identity survives change or interruption, then resemblance, contiguity or causation must unite the parts of it [Hume]
15220 To say something remains the same but lacks its capacities and powers seems a contradiction [Harré/Madden]
15222 Some individuals can gain or lose capacities or powers, without losing their identity [Harré/Madden]
15296 A particular might change all of its characteristics, retaining mere numerical identity [Harré/Madden]
14737 Properties cannot be relations to times, if there are temporary properties which are intrinsic [Lewis, by Sider]
3309 If a soldier continues to exist after serving as a soldier, does the wind cease to exist after it ceases to blow? [Benardete,JA]
6618 A 'substance' is a thing that remains the same when its properties change [Lowe]
16193 'Adverbialism' explains change by saying an object has-at-some-time a given property [Hawley]
16195 Presentism solves the change problem: the green banana ceases, so can't 'relate' to the yellow one [Hawley]
16202 The problem of change arises if there must be 'identity' of a thing over time [Hawley]
18930 Change is instantiation of a non-uniform distributional property, like 'being red-then-orange' [Cameron]
23018 How does a changing object retain identity or have incompatible properties over time? [Baron/Miller]