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Single Idea 15228
[filed under theme 10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
]
Full Idea
The concepts of necessity and contingency are detached from those of the apriori and the a posteriori.
Gist of Idea
Necessity and contingency are separate from the a priori and the a posteriori
Source
Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 1.IV)
Book Ref
Harré,R/Madden,E.H.: 'Causal Powers: A Theory of Natural Necessity' [Blackwell 1975], p.18
A Reaction
This seems to arise quite independently of Kripke, from the attack by the authors on the Humean view of modality. They also mention the possibility of the apriori contingent.
The
102 ideas
from 'Causal Powers'
15209
|
Like disastrous small errors in navigation, small misunderstandings can wreck intellectual life
[Harré/Madden]
|
15212
|
Analysis of concepts based neither on formalism nor psychology can arise from examining what we know
[Harré/Madden]
|
15210
|
Humeans see analysis in terms of formal logic, because necessities are fundamentally logical relations
[Harré/Madden]
|
15211
|
There is not an exclusive dichotomy between the formal and the logical
[Harré/Madden]
|
15213
|
Causation always involves particular productive things
[Harré/Madden]
|
15215
|
Philosophy devises and assesses conceptual schemes in the service of worldviews
[Harré/Madden]
|
15214
|
Natural necessity is not logical necessity or empirical contingency in disguise
[Harré/Madden]
|
15216
|
Is conceptual necessity just conventional, or does it mirror something about nature?
[Harré/Madden]
|
15217
|
Efficient causes combine stimulus to individuals, absence of contraints on activity
[Harré/Madden]
|
15219
|
Essence explains passive capacities as well as active powers
[Harré/Madden]
|
15220
|
To say something remains the same but lacks its capacities and powers seems a contradiction
[Harré/Madden]
|
15222
|
Some individuals can gain or lose capacities or powers, without losing their identity
[Harré/Madden]
|
15221
|
The relation between what a thing is and what it can do or undergo relate by natural necessity
[Harré/Madden]
|
15218
|
Scientists define copper almost entirely (bar atomic number) in terms of its dispositions
[Harré/Madden]
|
15223
|
Necessary effects will follow from some general theory specifying powers and structure of a world
[Harré/Madden]
|
15224
|
A necessity corresponds to the nature of the actual
[Harré/Madden]
|
15227
|
Logically, definitions have a subject, and a set of necessary predicates
[Harré/Madden]
|
15228
|
Necessity and contingency are separate from the a priori and the a posteriori
[Harré/Madden]
|
15225
|
Science investigates the nature and constitution of things or substances
[Harré/Madden]
|
15226
|
What properties a thing must have to be a type of substance can be laid down a priori
[Harré/Madden]
|
15229
|
We say there is 'no alternative' in all sorts of contexts, and there are many different grounds for it
[Harré/Madden]
|
15232
|
Natural necessity is when powerful particulars must produce certain results in a situation
[Harré/Madden]
|
15233
|
If natural necessity is used to include or exclude some predicate, the predicate is conceptually necessary
[Harré/Madden]
|
15230
|
Logical necessity is grounded in the logical form of a statement
[Harré/Madden]
|
15231
|
Transcendental necessity is conditions of a world required for a rational being to know its nature
[Harré/Madden]
|
15234
|
There is a transcendental necessity for each logical necessity, but the transcendental extends further
[Harré/Madden]
|
15235
|
There is a conceptual necessity when properties become a standard part of a nominal essence
[Harré/Madden]
|
15236
|
Positivism says science only refers to immediate experiences
[Harré/Madden]
|
15237
|
Originally Humeans based lawlike statements on pure qualities, without particulars
[Harré/Madden]
|
15238
|
Being lawlike seems to resist formal analysis, because there are always counter-examples
[Harré/Madden]
|
15240
|
In lawful universal statements (unlike accidental ones) we see why the regularity holds
[Harré/Madden]
|
15239
|
We could call any generalisation a law, if it had reasonable support and no counter-evidence
[Harré/Madden]
|
15241
|
Humeans say there is no necessity in causation, because denying an effect is never self-contradictory
[Harré/Madden]
|
15242
|
Having a child is contingent for a 'man', necessary for a 'father'; the latter reflects a necessity of nature
[Harré/Madden]
|
15245
|
It is silly to say that direct experience must be justified, either by reason, or by more experience
[Harré/Madden]
|
15248
|
Inference in perception is unconvincingly defended as non-conscious and almost instantaneous
[Harré/Madden]
|
15252
|
If Goldbach's Conjecture is true (and logically necessary), we may be able to conceive its opposite
[Harré/Madden]
|
15244
|
We experience qualities as of objects, not on their own
[Harré/Madden]
|
15243
|
We perceive motion, and not just successive occupations of different positions
[Harré/Madden]
|
15253
|
If the concept of a cause includes its usual effects, we call it a 'power'
[Harré/Madden]
|
15246
|
Active causal power is just objects at work, not something existing in itself
[Harré/Madden]
|
15254
|
If the nature of particulars explains their powers, it also explains their relations and behaviour
[Harré/Madden]
|
15255
|
Conjunctions explain nothing, and so do not give a reason for confidence in inductions
[Harré/Madden]
|
15256
|
Humeans cannot step in the same river twice, because they cannot strictly form the concept of 'river'
[Harré/Madden]
|
15257
|
The induction problem fades if you work with things, rather than with events
[Harré/Madden]
|
15258
|
Powers are not qualities; they just point to directions of empirical investigation
[Harré/Madden]
|
15259
|
Chemical atoms have two powers: to enter certain combinations, and to emit a particular spectrum
[Harré/Madden]
|
15260
|
Counterfactuals are just right for analysing statements about the powers which things have
[Harré/Madden]
|
15261
|
Humeans can only explain change with continuity as successive replacement
[Harré/Madden]
|
15262
|
In logic the nature of a kind, substance or individual is the essence which is inseparable from what it is
[Harré/Madden]
|
15264
|
The notorious substratum results from substance-with-qualities; individuals-with-powers solves this
[Harré/Madden]
|
15263
|
Chemistry is not purely structural; CO2 is not the same as SO2
[Harré/Madden]
|
15265
|
'Energy' is a quasi-substance invented as the bearer of change during interactions
[Harré/Madden]
|
15266
|
We say the essence of particles is energy, but only so we can tell a story about the nature of things
[Harré/Madden]
|
15271
|
If things are successive instantaneous events, nothing requires those events to resemble one another
[Harré/Madden]
|
15272
|
The good criticism of substance by Humeans also loses them the vital concept of a thing
[Harré/Madden]
|
15267
|
Events are changes in states of affairs (which consist of structured particulars, with powers and relations)
[Harré/Madden]
|
15279
|
Energy was introduced to physics to refer to the 'store of potency' of a moving ball
[Harré/Madden]
|
15268
|
Humeans construct their objects from events, but we construct events from objects
[Harré/Madden]
|
15273
|
Points can be 'dense' by unending division, but must meet a tougher criterion to be 'continuous'
[Harré/Madden]
|
15274
|
Points are 'continuous' if any 'cut' point participates in both halves of the cut
[Harré/Madden]
|
15275
|
'Dense' time raises doubts about continuous objects, so they need 'continuous' time
[Harré/Madden]
|
15270
|
Hume's atomic events makes properties independent, and leads to problems with induction
[Harré/Madden]
|
15269
|
Humean impressions are too instantaneous and simple to have structure or relations
[Harré/Madden]
|
15280
|
'Kinetic energy' is used to explain the effects of moving things when they are stopped
[Harré/Madden]
|
15277
|
The cause (or part of it) is what stimulates or releases the powerful particular thing involved
[Harré/Madden]
|
15278
|
Humean accounts of causal direction by time fail, because cause and effect can occur together
[Harré/Madden]
|
15276
|
Some powers need a stimulus, but others are just released
[Harré/Madden]
|
15286
|
Clavius's Paradox: purely syntactic entailment theories won't explain, because they are too profuse
[Harré/Madden]
|
15283
|
Simplicity can sort theories out, but still leaves an infinity of possibilities
[Harré/Madden]
|
15284
|
Contraposition may be equivalent in truth, but not true in nature, because of irrelevant predicates
[Harré/Madden]
|
15285
|
The items put forward by the contraposition belong within different natural clusters
[Harré/Madden]
|
15281
|
Humeans see predicates as independent, but science says they are connected
[Harré/Madden]
|
15287
|
The possibility that all ravens are black is a law depends on a mechanism producing the blackness
[Harré/Madden]
|
15288
|
People doubt science because if it isn't logically necessary it seems to be absolutely contingent
[Harré/Madden]
|
15289
|
Property or event relations are naturally necessary if generated by essential mechanisms
[Harré/Madden]
|
15290
|
What reduces the field of the possible is a step towards necessity
[Harré/Madden]
|
15291
|
There is 'absolute' necessity (implied by all propositions) and 'relative' necessity (from what is given)
[Harré/Madden]
|
15293
|
If explanation is by entailment, that lacks a causal direction, unlike natural necessity
[Harré/Madden]
|
15294
|
Powers can explain the direction of causality, and make it a natural necessity
[Harré/Madden]
|
15292
|
We can base the idea of a natural kind on the mechanisms that produce natural necessity
[Harré/Madden]
|
15295
|
Theism is supposed to make the world more intelligible - and should offer results
[Harré/Madden]
|
15296
|
A particular might change all of its characteristics, retaining mere numerical identity
[Harré/Madden]
|
15298
|
We prefer the theory which explains and predicts the powers and capacities of particulars
[Harré/Madden]
|
15297
|
We can infer a new property of a thing from its other properties, via its essential nature
[Harré/Madden]
|
15300
|
Fundamental particulars can't change
[Harré/Madden]
|
15299
|
Species do not have enough constancy to be natural kinds
[Harré/Madden]
|
15301
|
The very concepts of a particular power or nature imply the possibility of being generalised
[Harré/Madden]
|
15304
|
We can escape substance and its properties, if we take fields of pure powers as ultimate
[Harré/Madden]
|
15302
|
We explain powers by the natures of things, but explanations end in inexplicable powers
[Harré/Madden]
|
15303
|
Maybe a physical field qualifies as ultimate, if its nature is identical with its powers
[Harré/Madden]
|
15305
|
Some powers are variable, others cannot change (without destroying an identity)
[Harré/Madden]
|
15306
|
Only changes require explanation
[Harré/Madden]
|
15309
|
The assumption that shape and solidity are fundamental implies dubious 'substance' in bodies
[Harré/Madden]
|
15310
|
Solidity comes from the power of repulsion, and shape from the power of attraction
[Harré/Madden]
|
15317
|
Powers and natures lead us to hypothesise underlying mechanisms, which may be real
[Harré/Madden]
|
15315
|
What is a field of potentials, if it only consists of possible events?
[Harré/Madden]
|
15318
|
Gravitational and electrical fields are, for a materialist, distressingly empty of material
[Harré/Madden]
|
15316
|
The powers/natures approach has been so successful (for electricity, magnetism, gravity) it may be universal
[Harré/Madden]
|
15319
|
Hard individual blocks don't fix what 'things' are; fluids are no less material things
[Harré/Madden]
|
15320
|
Magnetic and gravity fields can occupy the same place without merging
[Harré/Madden]
|
15321
|
Space can't be an individual (in space), but it is present in all places
[Harré/Madden]
|