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Single Idea 15235

[filed under theme 10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts ]

Full Idea

When discoveries about the nature of a thing or substance explain or justify our holding that certain properties are its nominal essence, then the diachronic process of meaning development creates a genuine conceptual necessity.

Clarification

'diachronic' means over a period of time

Gist of Idea

There is a conceptual necessity when properties become a standard part of a nominal essence

Source

Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 1.VI)

Book Ref

Harré,R/Madden,E.H.: 'Causal Powers: A Theory of Natural Necessity' [Blackwell 1975], p.22

A Reaction

This sounds like a pretty good account of one of the bases for conceptual necessity. They seem to think that conceptual necessity rests on a mixture of real and nominal essence (but then some of the nominal features are also real).

Related Ideas

Idea 15233 If natural necessity is used to include or exclude some predicate, the predicate is conceptually necessary [Harré/Madden]

Idea 12531 Nominal Essence is the abstract idea to which a name is attached [Locke]

The 13 ideas with the same theme [necessity based on relations of concepts]:

24030 3+4=7 is necessary because we cannot conceive of seven without including three and four [Descartes]
18796 Formal experience conditions show what is possible, and general conditions what is necessary [Kant]
22018 Necessary truths derive from basic assertion and negation [Fichte, by Pinkard]
15216 Is conceptual necessity just conventional, or does it mirror something about nature? [Harré/Madden]
15235 There is a conceptual necessity when properties become a standard part of a nominal essence [Harré/Madden]
16422 The necessity of a proposition concerns reality, not our words or concepts [Stalnaker]
16423 Conceptual possibilities are metaphysical possibilities we can conceive of [Stalnaker]
13810 The source of de dicto necessity is not concepts, but the actual properties of the thing [Forbes,G]
12028 De re necessity is a form of conceptual necessity, just as de dicto necessity is [Forbes,G]
11169 Conceptual necessities rest on the nature of all concepts [Fine,K]
15087 Conceptual necessities are made true by all concepts [Hale]
12436 Concept-identities explain how we know necessities, not why they are necessary [Hale]
15033 Humeans says mathematics and logic are necessary because that is how our concept of necessity works [Sider]