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Full Idea
The original Humean suggestion was that lawlike statements must contain only purely qualitative predicates - that is, predicates which do not require in a statement of their meaning a reference to any particular object or spatio-temporal location.
Gist of Idea
Originally Humeans based lawlike statements on pure qualities, without particulars
Source
Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 2.II)
Book Ref
Harré,R/Madden,E.H.: 'Causal Powers: A Theory of Natural Necessity' [Blackwell 1975], p.30
A Reaction
Harré and Madden are keen to promote particulars (with powers) as the foundation of scientific theory, and I agree with them. It strikes me as quite elementary that generalisations arise from particulars, so can't fundamentally explain them.
8379 | In causal laws, 'events' must recur, so they have to be universals, not particulars [Russell] |
16246 | Rather than take necessitation between universals as primitive, just make laws primitive [Maudlin on Armstrong] |
9480 | Armstrong has an unclear notion of contingent necessitation, which can't necessitate anything [Bird on Armstrong] |
17681 | The laws of nature link properties with properties [Armstrong] |
15876 | Maybe laws of nature are just relations between properties? [Harré] |
15093 | We might say laws are necessary by combining causal properties with Armstrong-Dretske-Tooley laws [Shoemaker] |
15237 | Originally Humeans based lawlike statements on pure qualities, without particulars [Harré/Madden] |
14639 | Individuals enter into laws only through their general qualities and relations [McMichael] |
9432 | Laws of nature are necessary relations between universal properties, rather than about particulars [Mumford] |
9433 | If laws can be uninstantiated, this favours the view of them as connecting universals [Mumford] |
9473 | Laws cannot offer unified explanations if they don't involve universals [Bird] |
9484 | If the universals for laws must be instantiated, a vanishing particular could destroy a law [Bird] |
19039 | The view that laws are grounded in substance plus external necessity doesn't suit dispositionalism [Vetter] |